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Summary of Portfolio 
Research methodologies for professional enquiry 
This was my first module in which methodological frameworks, philosophies and methods of 
data collection were explored. Being the first module, key concepts and approaches were 
discussed along with key issues in education, health and social science research. Research 
questions that arose from my professional practice were evaluated as part of the assignment of 
this module. The second part included highlighting the application aspects of Tawjihi exams 
to inquire about the learner experiences against the expectations of the society within the 
professional setting of school in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.  
 
Social Theory and Education: Key Issues and Debates 
In this module an introduction to theories related to education was given. Wenger, Dewey and 
others were discussed and theoretical perspectives were also introduced including communities 
of practice on which my assignment focused. The importance of communities of practice was 
highlighted as a theoretical model of learning through which authentic involvement can be 
created. The assignment investigated different understandings of how to coordinate 
communities of practice as a management of ideology of empowerment, and how the 
community theory could be used in a number of professions. This was introduced through a 
case study of multinational staff who are working at UNRWA as interpreters and translators 
 
Creativity in practice  
In this module, I was encouraged to consider new way to present data. As the first part of this 
assignment, I produced a clip in which a short talk was given about the negative aspects of the 
educational system in Palestine as video has been used for long time in the process of both 
learning and teaching. The second component of the assignment was a reflection on the practice 
based research component in which a commentary was written to discuss several points 
including Anna Craft’s ‘possibility thinking’ and justification of the presentation.   
v 
Institutions, discontinuities and systems of knowledge 
The assignment of this module was mainly about the nature of the analysed discontinuity and 
the theoretical perspective of this analysis. In this study, social and symbolic construction of 
personal identity was demonstrated and various forms of data were used including interview. 
The interview was conducted with the subject whose story was the case study of the 
assignment. He suffered severely as a result of homelessness and deprivation of belonging. It 
was argued through this case study that identity, which is basically configured around 
belonging, is engaged with counter culture as a result of not belonging.  
 
Cultural Practices  
In this module a range of cultural practices theoretical frameworks were discussed and 
explored. As understanding of cultural impact and cultural practices and reflecting upon that 
was one of the module outcome, my assignment was about the cultural effects of the cultural 
exchange programs held by the American consulate on the Palestinian students at schools. 
Three students were interviewed and their lives in Gaza brought into focus. The Arts based 
method of Zines technique was used in the interviews as a means of ensuring the gathering of 
rich data. The perception of three subjects of their experience in the USA and reflections on 
that was discussed; this shed light on their lives in Gaza.     
 
Thesis in context 
This module drew upon the other modules we have previously had and provided the first step 
towards writing my thesis. It helped considering the need for an analytical and demonstrative 
approach to my research investigation. Through this module, I realised in particular the scope 
for utilising philosophical perspectives that would help in explaining the situation I want to 
focus on. This module was the first draft of my thesis first draft proposal. It helped me a lot in 
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This thesis presents a critical study of the experience of Palestinian academics living 
and studying abroad. Two key, interrelated research questions guide the study. First, how does 
a Palestinian academic living and studying abroad experience displacement from origin? And 
second, how can these experiences be written about and communicated? The thesis constructs 
an experimental proposition by refusing to make distinctions between data, epistemological 
content and myself as the researcher. Situated at a juncture between theory and story, I draw 
from my own direct experience of dislocation and displacement, using a narrative mode of 
storytelling as a mode of inquiry which is then intersected by critical readings of supporting 
theory. The discourse which emerges is a heterodox mixture of narrative and theory which 
challenges the conventional separation between researcher, data and epistemological content. 
This experience is mainly engaged with the theory of the State of Exception by Giorgio 
Agamben. The study tries to question to what extent Agamben regarding the State of Exception 
can be applied to the situation in Gaza Strip and the lives of those academics and their families. 
It deals with this by analysing the day-to-day experiences of Palestinian people, especially 
Palestinian academics and their families and in this study a Palestinian educator. 
The work of Giorgio Agamben, Gilles Deleuze and others emerges within this study as 
a recurrent conversation on the subjects of the State of Exception, bare life, symbolic violence, 
nomadism, and the rhizome. Just as the narrative voice of the thesis “reterritorializes” the space 
of academic discourse, so the text shifts between thick descriptions of the spatial conditions of 
Palestine as experienced by myself and other Palestinian academics and educators and broader 
critical reflections on the nature of space and subjectivity. Additionally, this textual discourse 
is joined by a curatorial discourse which frames the events discussed with visual images and 
objects, the material and visual signs and traces which refract the experience of Palestinian 
academics living and studying abroad. Questioning conventional limits, the overall 
contribution of this thesis is to push and experiment with new methodologies of arts-based 
research which will enable my own subjectivity to present in the data in order for my 
experiences to be documented. 
  
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis originates in a series of personal journeys which, over time, have crystallised into 
narratives which link the personal with the political. The process of writing has, in a real way, 
followed the routes and trajectories of a journey from Palestine to the UK.  The boundaries 
between places, as well as the “no man’s” lands of in-between states, provided junctures in 
the stories: they were places where the pressure to create narrative built up, along with 
theoretical reflection. What follows is therefore a mixture of first person narrative and 
theoretical analysis—a mixture which itself is theorised through critical engagements with 
other voices which have explored the means by which experience is documented and 
analysed both objectively and subjectively.  
The work below presents a critical study of the experience of Palestinian academics 
and their families living and studying abroad in the UK. It is organised around two 
fundamental research questions. First, how does a Palestinian academic living and studying 
abroad experience displacement from origin? And second, how can these experiences be 
written about and communicated? As will be discussed in detail, answering these questions 
has required the building of a distinct methodology related to a series of three key stories 
centring around an extended meditation on Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of the State of 
Exception (2003). Reaching back into my own experience of childhood, and focussing on the 
recent past, the stories and commentaries below seek to outline new ways of understanding 





1.1 “Leaving everything behind and the theory of State of Exception” 
Giorgio Agamben’s purpose in writing about “the State of Exception” is to examine 
what he calls “a point of imbalance” or the “no-man’s land” between “public law and political 
fact” (Agamben, 2010, p.1). This imbalance, or no-man’s land, is not a permanent state of 
affairs but, as its name implies, an exceptional state of affairs originating in the declaration by 
a sovereign power in response to extreme internal conflict. Indeed, the very phrase “State of 
Exception” is taken from the German political theorist Carl Schmitt’s definition of the 
sovereign in his 1922 Political theory in which he explains that the sovereign is “he who decides 
on the State of Exception” (Schmitt, 2010 [1922], p.34). What this State of Exception declared 
by the sovereign actually consists of, is a suspension of the law. Herein lies its potential for 
extreme consequences on those subjects of the sovereign who are ordinarily protected by law.  
For Agamben, the State of Exception creates a dangerous space of indistinction in 
which the sovereign power is free to act in ways which ordinarily would be limited by the law. 
With the law suspended, the sovereign’s power may become absolute. At the same time, 
political beings who once were protected by the law may be “abandoned” by the sovereign to 
“a stripped down creaturely life” without rights or protection (Agamben, 2010, p.2). To 
understand the significance of this “stripped down creaturely life” in Agamben’s theory of the 
State of Exception, it is necessary to refer to his earlier work Homo Sacer which drew on an 
obscure definition within Roman law of a figure who, having committed certain crimes, was 
expelled from society, had his rights expunged and became known as a “homo sacer”—he 
could be killed by anybody with impunity, and yet could not be sacrificed for religious purposes 
as his life was still deemed sacred (Agamben, 2016). As such, the homo sacer was both 
excluded from the law, and included at the same time. This paradox, for Agamben, is captured 
in the homo sacer possessing one of the two forms of life defined in the classical Greek political 
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system: he had zoe, that is, the bare life that all gods, men, and animals possess, but not bios—
life qualified towards some end, proper to an individual or group (Frost, 2015, p.56). 
1.2 Homo sacer and the rights of the citizens 
The homo sacer is an embodiment of the State of Exception. As a man who is not a 
man, the body of the homo sacer works as a model for the indeterminate space of the State of 
Exception which—like the concentration camps of Nazi Germany, or the contemporary US 
facility Guantanamo Bay—is a real, bordered space which stands outside the ordinary coverage 
of the law. It is these two states of exception—one historical, one ongoing, which form the key 
examples explored by Agamben. The first establishes the paradigm of totalitarianism in the 
twentieth century which allows for “the physical elimination not only of political adversaries, 
but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political 
system” (Agamben, 2010, p.2). The second produces “a legally unnamable and unclassifiable 
being”, Taliban members enjoying neither the status of POWs nor the status of persons charged 
with crimes according to American laws (Agamben, 2010, 3). Such people nevertheless, as the 
‘zoe’ component of Agamben’s work describes, still exist and therefore must ‘be’ somewhere, 
but that because these people lack the qualities of any political identity, this place is also outside 
the constitutional aspects of any such region, and is therefore by definition, the ‘camp’, such 
as the detention, concentration, or immigration camp.  
As mentioned earlier, a State of Exception occurs during times of political crisis such as 
situations where there is a serious internal conflict in a state. Such circumstances require the 
mechanism of a very powerful sovereign who will be deciding on what are to be considered as 
exceptions. As Agamben (drawing on the work of Carl Schmidt) explains, it was Hitler who 
most drastically used his enormous power to decree an indefinitely prolonged State of 
Exception, suspending the articles of the Weimar constitution which would have provided 
legal protection for those in the population whom the Nazis wished to eliminate.  
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Hitler declared a State of Exception for an entire twelve years which allowed for legal civil war 
that allowed him to eliminate any political obstacle in his leadership as well as individuals who 
tried to overthrow him (Agamben, 2010).  
Developing the idea of the State of Exception further in terms of sovereignty, it is 
important to understand what Agamben means by a “sovereign” power. This involves grasping 
the paradox (first formulated by Schmitt) that “the sovereign stands outside of the normally 
valid juridical order, and yet belongs to it, for it is he who is responsible for deciding whether 
the constitution can be suspended in toto (Agamben, 2010, p.35). For this reason it makes sense 
for Agamben to speak of the “capture of space”—an idea which is particularly important in the 
experience of borders, territories, and journeys which are described further on in this project. 
 The State of Exception suspends the normal rights of those whose lives it dominates, 
removing the rule of law and dictating what people may or may not do—without appeal to any 
form of accountability. The normal rights of a citizen do not exist at a time of exception. While 
the State of Exception was historically most starkly and spectacularly exhibited in the 
prolonged emergency politics of the Third Reich, Agamben has argued that it is also a highly 
contemporary condition which persists at the heart of the so-called democratic world. In the 
United States, the normal rights of citizens were, according to Agamben, 
formally suspended as a result of the “military order” declared by George W. Bush on 
November 13th 2001, when he ordered an indefinite detention and trial of non-citizens due to 
suspicion of terrorism (Agamben, 2010, p.22). This trial was to be carried out by military 
commissions invested with extraordinary juridical power, unlike the military tribunal which is 
constrained overall by the law of the land and which ostensibly protects the rights of living 
beings.  
For Agamben, a State of Exception is a state in which all the basic rights of a citizen are 
suspended and an absolute use of power may be wielded with impunity against a subject almost 
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entirely (according to Agamben) lacking in agency to resist in the absence of law (a point 
nonetheless contested by subsequent readers of Agamben’s work who do claim that the subject 
of the State of Exception may still exert agency at the local scale of everyday activities 
(Abujidi, 2009, Pp.290-292). The State of Exception may not originate as an intent but results 
as an outcome of state policy which requires the government to give more power and more 
force to its military, and to reduce the constitutional rights of its citizens. The sovereign then 
determines the period of time that the suspension of the rights will last. At this time 
the military power has the authority to further exercise their war time authority on civilians, 
something that they cannot do on normal times. This suspension affected a specific place in 
a nation, a place which was suspected of conflicts or disturbances and coups to overthrow the 
existing government. Agamben argued that some groups of people were entirely kept outside 
the political system (Tuastad, 2017).  
1.3 Expanding the State of Exception: the US and Guantanamo Bay 
The importance of Agamben’s investigation of the State of Exception is not limited to 
the consideration of the Nazi concentration camps and Guantanamo Bay. Indeed, its 
importance rests on the fact that it establishes a conceptual framework for analysing many 
different political situations in evidence across space and time. Since its initial publication, 
State of Exception has been developed and critiqued across multiple contexts and disciplines, 
amassing a substantial critical heritage. Agamben’s sharp critique of US sovereignty has been 
particularly provocative. William (2003) has developed the limited focus of Agamben on 
Guantanamo Bay into a full-scale implication of US foreign policy, extending the space of the 
State of Exception into a global geopolitical condition for nations subject to US imperialism.  
In the case of Guantanamo Bay, the sovereign power is so great that detainees are left 
with effectively no identity or recognition or protection under the law at all, The US regime 
went so far as to order the removal of all detainees’ records from the United States, expunging 
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even this legal trace within the juridical system, effectively de-legitimizing any claim they 
might have to citizens’ rights and protection under US law. In such a denuded state it was easy 
for the US regime to consider detainees as having only a minimum of “bare life,” that which, 
according to Agamben, can be stripped away and even destroyed with impunity (Agamben, 
2016). Without a trail of documentation to protect them, it was easy for the US state to charge 
detainees with any unlawful act such as violating immigration rules or any other criminal act. 
These individuals tended, therefore, to lack any protection whatsoever, even that of a person 
charged with a crime in the United States, or that of a POW as per the 
Geneva conventions. Such detainment leaves one with no legal rights in respect of the law 
since there is no law to defend them—they are simply left at the mercy of a merciless sovereign 
who has in fact used his power to suspend their rights even those governing their status 
as immigrants (Attell, 2004). 
The State of Exception is bound together both with the condition of the military siege and 
with war in general. During periods of war, democratic institutions are nonetheless designed to 
control and regulate the temporary deployment of absolute powers. Yet, this has led to the 
wholesale liquidation of democracy. In the Second World War as well as the US’s prolonged 
War on Terror, the legislative powers of parliament have been totally erased in some areas, 
only later to be modified and changed by the executive power (Overboe, 2007). The practice 
of modification of the legislative laws is now a common practice, yet it was something that had 
originally been introduced at a time when states required a State of Exception emanating from 
a crisis and emergency during war time. The majority of leaders in contemporary society now 
apply States of Exception as a matter of course, making it central to their style of leadership as, 
for example, the office of President of the United States has continued to deal with immigrants 
detained for a short period and whose legal status is rapidly erased (Bigo, 2007). 
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Agamben observes that, from the late nineteenth century onwards both Germany and Italy 
instituted States of Exception on a regular basis “for reasons of urgent and absolute necessity,” 
yet the judgment concerning this necessity and urgency was “not subject to any oversight” 
(Agamben, 2010, p.17). More and more frequent cases tended to normalise the State of 
Exception as simply the persistent state of crisis permitting absolute sovereign power. Yet, both 
Italy and Germany went further by erecting effectively a second constitutional state within the 
bounds of their existing sovereignty, and maintaining that second state as a State of Exception 
applied to limited portions of society, defined by race, ethnicity, or culture. The existence of a 
dual state allowed the government not to apply two sets of laws but rather to entirely suspend 
the law in regard to some citizens while keeping it in place for others. With that split made, 
unlimited violence could be perpetrated without any need to answer for it.  
Giroux (2006) has moved in a different direction, highlighting states of exception which 
have come into force within US national boundaries, in particular during hurricane Katrina 
when a “politics of disposability” prevailed in the Bush administration, raising “existential and 
material questions regarding who is going to die and who is going to live” (Giroux, 2006, 
p.171). In this case a natural disaster gave grounds for the declaration of a State of Exception, 
yet, as Giroux shows, it merely served to frame, in an extreme form, the centuries-old State of 
Exception in which black women and men had been living under US sovereignty. 
 The powers behind this kind of democratic and right denial justify their actions and 
measures using the fact that those detained are not citizens. A case in the United States between 
Bush and Rasul, where the Supreme Court suspended the rights of non-United States citizens 
imprisoned in non-United States territory. The court rejected an argument on sovereignty and 
jurisdiction by the detainees. The court upheld the entire all the jurisdiction rights of the 
Guantánamo detainee cases (Ojakangas, 2005). 
1.4 The State of Exception as a spatial condition and bio-political control 
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In much of the literature which has emanated from Agamben’s thought, the issue of 
spatiality has been particularly nuanced. The State of Exception always leaves a mark, a 
demarcation, boundary, margin, inscription of some kind. Isin and Rygiel have contributed 
important work to our understanding of the global spatial forms these states may take in 
frontiers, camps, and variously defined zones. Crucially, they have also begun to theorise the 
affective “abjection” which marks the subjective experience of life lived in a State of Exception 
(Isin & Rygiel, 2007). Where Agamben’s work represents a work of philosophical and political 
theory, others have been able to apply this theory directly to case studies drawing on empirical 
primary research. Hanafi and Long’s research on Palestinian refugee camps is exemplary in 
this case, demonstrating how the absence of governance structures in the Nahr al-Bared, 
Beddawi, and ‘Ayn al-Hilweh refugee camps in Lebanon has both fostered forms of extremism, 
but also emergent “economies of morals” to fill the legal void of the State of Exception which 
otherwise prevails (Hanafi & Long, 2010).  
The concept of bare life is the stripping of the most fundamental rights of a living being, 
which are the political and legal attribute, whose very existence is a clear indication of the 
sovereign’s central power and influence. The courts involved in denying the non-citizens their 
bare life, went further to ensure that minimal rights were given to the detainees. Sovereign 
power has a close relation with the nakedness of the bare life of the two detainees from 
Guantánamo. The detainees suffer house arrest and electronic tagging in some state which is 
an indication of a bio-political control by some sovereign leaders (Agamben, 2016). 
 Agamben states that the technology of bio-political control as well as the modern laws 
is a major reason for the continuation of State of Exception in the contemporary world. The 
separation of legal cultures from philosophical cultures has led to the fall of philosophical 
cultures and the rise of legal cultures at the same time (Attel, 2004). The evolution of politics 
and people’s rights has contributed in a major way in constraining the courts and not allowing 
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them to do what is lawfully acceptable and right to all human beings despite their races or 
origins. 
 Leaders in the contemporary culture, even those from democratic states, tend to exercise 
State of Exception. This happens when they are facing rebellion from some of the people they 
are ruling or during cases of terrorist attacks. Sovereign leaders use this emergency power to 
eliminate political rivals and justify it as legal war, a term which will be easily accepted by the 
majority of the citizens without question. State of Exception is only necessary in times of 
extreme crisis and should end once the crisis is over (Coleman, 2007).                                                
The legislative power and judicial powers have a say in the daily regulations put in place 
by the executive arm, thus should also be considered by the executive power before it shifts all 
the power to itself. Decentralization of power at times where there is no State of Exception 
should always be there for an efficient and democratic state to run effectively. 
1.5 Beyond Agamben: The State of Exception and the context of Middle East  
One of the examples of the extended states of emergency that of Egypt. Although the 
state of emergency is known to be temporary and is a reaction to a danger that targets the state, 
the state of emergency has lasted more than 45 years (1976-2017). The state was lifted for 18 
months in 1980, but it was imposed again after the assassination of the Egyptian President 
Anwar El Sadat in 1981. It was also lifted for a few months in 2012. Thus, the temporariness 
of this state turned to be permanent.  It is that moment when the rights of anyone who could be 
considered as a threat to the security of the country could be stripped.  At the end of 2017, the 
state of emergency was extended again for three months. 
As a result of the Oslo agreement in 1993, both Palestinian and Israelis agreed on 
implementing an arrangement that included at that time the establishment of the Palestinian 
National Authority. The establishment of the Palestinian National Authority was achieved in 
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two separate agreements. The first was the Gaza-Jericho agreement, which was signed in Cairo 
in 1994, and the second was the Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement signed in Washington in 
1995 (Khatib, 2007). Being denied the right to return, Palestinian people started settling in 
different Arab countries. The main hosts include Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Syria. About 
900,000 Palestinians were debarred beyond the borders of Israel and they became stateless 
since Palestinian state was not established on pre-1984 Palestine (Todorova, 2014). The 
governments of those counties have not shown any responsibility for the displacement of the 
Palestinian and thus the shelters and aids were provided by UNRWA (United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency). Refugees in the countries above have not had any kind of legal or political 
fortification. Soon, camps were established for those refugees in the countries mentioned. 
It was obvious that UNRWA was not going to guarantee a good quality of life for those 
refugees. Their civil rights were not recognised in the host countries, Lebanon treated them 
very harshly (Martin, 2011). Palestinian refugees have never enjoyed equal rights to citizens in 
terms of possessing properties or moving freely and these segregation practices were always 
justified by the refusal of naturalisation of the Palestinian people and to make such 
discrimination legal, governments always pretended that such settlement will harm the essence 
of the Palestinian cause and will definitely affect the right to return.  
In Gaza Strip, thousands of Palestinian emigrants were seeking shelters and a new life. 
Camps were also established, and UNRWA started monitoring and supervising those camps. 
However, Israel, as an occupying country, has always been responsible of controlling the lives 
of the Palestinian people in Gaza and in many cases controlling the wok of UNRWA in Gaza 
Strip. Palestinians, in general, and refugees, in particular, in Gaza Strip have been suffering 
marginalization for decades by the Israeli authorities who have administrated the lives of 
people in Gaza following the end of the Egyptian military administration there.  
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The experience of Palestinians requires a theoretical and political language to describe 
and represent its specificity, which Agamben’s discourse on the State of Exception provides. 
Agamben’s own research is necessarily limited in scope—his focus being on Germany and the 
United States—yet subsequent scholars have demonstrated the applicability of Agamben’s 
theorization of the State of Exception to alternative political geographies. In order to lay out 
the grounds of the present research, with its focus on Palestine, it is useful first to become 
familiar with comparable attempts by other researchers to instrumentalise the idea of the State 
of Exception in different geopolitical contexts. This will form the content of the following 
section, in relation specifically to work on Bosnia and Ireland.  
1.6 Geopolitical conflict in Bosnia and Ireland and its link to State of Exception theory 
The State of Exception is defined in the writing of Giorgio Agamben as an “ambiguous, 
uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political,” the “legal form 
of what cannot have legal form,” the “suspension of law itself,” a “no-man’s- land between 
public and political fact,” a “threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism” 
where individuals are the “object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is indefinite not 
only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed from the 
law and from judicial oversight,” and exist therefore in a state where “bare life reaches its 
maximum indeterminacy” (Agamben, 2010, Pp.1-3). The present section will focus on the two 
geopolitical arenas of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ireland as case studies in which Agamben’s 
thought has undergone significant development by other scholars (Gregory & Pred, 2013). 
1.7 The State of Exception in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Mujkić argues that Bosnia-Herzegovina “is a state with international sovereignty . . . 
but without clear domestic sovereignty” (Mujkić, 2010, p.125). In Agamben’s account, the 
sovereign is both within and without the law—yet in the absence of such a figure the entire 
state exists in a condition of indeterminacy. In the wake of massive conflict in the region 
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throughout the twentieth century, the zone of the nation state has become coincident not with 
the extents of a government’s sovereignty but with an indeterminate zone, a “no-man’s- land,” 
to use Agamben’s term. Yet whereas such zones—the camps of Nazi Germany, or Guantanamo 
Bay—were theorised by Agamben as having been programmatically circumscribed by 
sovereign powers specifically in order to mark select people as killable with impunity, 
according to Mujkić’s account the State of Exception has become the de facto condition in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Corroborating this is Rivi’s argument that since the Dayton Agreements 
of 1995, the newly formed nation-state of Bosnia-Herzegovina “has been living in a condition 
of exception as described by Agamben, that of a country ‘exceptionally’ patrolled by UN 
forces” (Rivi, 2016, p.73). As such, for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the exception has become the 
norm. 
For Humphrey (2002), the current condition has resulted from the successive failures 
of previous attempts upon the part of ethnically-defined political groups to form new states 
circumscribed by racial identity. Bosnians and Croats were identified by Serbs as irredeemably 
other and, as such, consigned to a realm of existence outside of the law such that they could be 
de-humanised and eliminated to fulfil a political aim. Such logic clearly conforms to 
Agamben’s description of the prolonged State of Exception initiated by the Nazis. Yet, within 
the wider context of the wars in the Balkan region and their aftermath, there are warnings over 
the wholesale application of Agamben’s theories to the different political situations that pertain 
within the territories concerned. Levy, for example, has charged that “Agamben and his more 
enthusiastic followers lack any proportionality, when they distastefully lump together varieties 
of refugee camps, Auschwitz, and even gated communities” (Levy, 2010, p.100). The critique 
here concerns a matter of degree. States of exception may exist in multiple contexts—yet they 
cannot be blanketed together. The politics behind such a critique of Agamben ultimately 
challenges the basic helplessness he attributes to the victim. Undoubtedly this holds in many 
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circumstances, yet as Levy points out, the refugee (as just one example) should not always be 
represented as the passive victim of biopolitics. 
Agamben argues that the State of Exception operates by “at once excluding bare life 
and capturing it within the political order” (Agamben, 2010, p.9). In order to propose that such 
states of exception pertain not only to recognised totalitarian regimes, but also to democracies, 
Agamben highlights the detention of “enemy combatants” by the US at Guantanamo Bay and 
the indeterminate legal status in which they are suspended. It may be that Agamben selects this 
case study for its dramatic effect—geared as it is towards a critique of the imperialism of the 
world’s current most powerful nation state. Yet, this critique can be extended to other arenas. 
Contemporary Ireland provides a compelling case for developing Agamben’s theory to the de 
jure operation of a democratic state.  
De Wispelaere, McBride, and O’Neill, for example, have highlighted the thinning line 
between democracy and absolutism in Ireland’s unequal deployment of citizenship rights. The 
“draconian legislation” of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill imposes heavy 
surveillance and social restrictions upon those immigrants whom the government does not 
deem economically necessary- for example, denying them the right to marry (De Wispelaere, 
McBride, & O’Neill, 2016, p.54). At the same time skilled workers and affluent members of 
the Irish diaspora abroad (particularly in the US) are offered advantages through “patriot” acts. 
The result is that such legislation “allows the state to erase the individual’s legal status at will” 
(De Wispelaere, McBride, & O’Neill, 2016, p.54). The significance of this observation in the 
context of Agamben’s work is that where Agamben identifies the State of Exception in extreme 





1.8 State of Exception in Northern Ireland 
Much like Bosnia-Herzegovina, it could be argued, Northern Ireland can be presented 
in terms of a narrative of “the chronic state of emergency,” making the territory at large an 
“exception to governmentality” (Scarlet, 2014, p.14). In fact, in both the cases of contemporary 
Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina, it could be argued that an “ambiguous, uncertain, 
borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political,” has emerged as the result of 
the exceptional conditions of war bleeding into the “ordinary” conditions of democracy 
(Agamben, 2010, p.2). As Jones as insightfully put it, “the procedural conditions of exception 
thought essential to the task of waging the long war against terrorism required an essential shift 
away from more familiar declarations of emergency” and it follows that this then fulfils 
Agamben’s prognostication that the declaration of the State of Exception might gradually come 
to be replaced “by an unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as the normal 
technique of government” (Jones, 2013, n.p.). 
In closing, it could be said that it is this point which defines the most significant way in 
which the cases of Bosni-Herzegovina and Ireland develop the thought of Agamben on the 
State of Exception. As democratic nations emerging from violent histories of anti-democracy, 
they both embody troubling continuities of the absolutism of the state in relation to the 




Chapter 2: Palestine as a State of Exception 
2.1 Introduction: Palestine as a “camp” 
The idea of a State of Exception has proved especially productive and critical in the study of 
Palestine. Agamben’s theories have found relevance to the legal situation in Palestine, to the 
conditions in which subjects there experience basic rights (or lack of rights), as well as to the 
particular spatial conditions in which existence takes place. Given the territorial condition of 
Palestine as a de jure state partially occupied by Israel (itself a proxy of the West), which is 
also host to a great many refugee camps, the idea of the State of Exception as a “camp” is 
particularly appropriate to discussing Palestine—as well as Palestinian refugee camps abroad 
(of which there are many in neighbouring Jordan and Lebanon). 
Before discussing Agamben’s detailed theorization of the camp as the spatial 
expression of a State of Exception, it is first necessary to introduce and position Palestine as a 
relevant case study. The history of Palestine cannot be adequately summarised here and has 
been dealt with in great depth from a variety of historiographical positions elsewhere (see Said, 
1979; Pappe, 2004; Smith, 2004). Yet, it is crucial to emphasise the history of spatial rupture 
which marked the experience of Palestinians in the wake of the First World War. Having been 
administered in a relatively tolerant way under the Ottoman empire, after the fall of the 
Ottomans Palestine was split into British and French mandates which gradually marginalised 
Arab leadership in favour of Jewish, and oversaw the attrition of Palestinian control over the 
land of Palestine, culminating in the split of historic Palestine and the declaration of the state 
of Israel (Stearns, 2008, s.v. “Palestine”). While neighbouring Arab states—Lebanon, 
Transjordan, Syria, and Egypt—fought on behalf of Palestine, by 1949 Israel held eighty per 
cent of historic Palestine. Palestinian refugees were prevented from returning to their homes, 
their property was destroyed and, as Stearns writes, “from that moment, Palestinians ceased to 
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exist as a community in one physical space” (Stearns, 2008, s.v. “Palestine”). Thus 1948 is 
remembered by Palestinians as the Nakba, or catastrophe. 
 The details of the subsequent Palestine-Israeli conflict cannot be rehearsed here but are 
well known. What is important is to emphasise the catastrophic spatial effects of conflict and 
the destabilizing of legal and social structures which have created a permanent State of 
Exception in Palestine. Before engaging the theoretical interventions which have connected the 
state of Palestine with Agamben’s notion of the camp and the State of Exception it is useful to 
recall elements of the actual spatial conditions of everyday life in Palestine.  
 Above all what must be recalled is the fencing-in and walling-off of Palestinian 
territory. The border condition of the land exists not only in a peripheral sense around the outer 
edge of Palestinian territory, but also around the gradually encroaching annexes which Israel 
has increasingly, and illegally, settled. The physical manifestation of these bordering and 
annexation exercises lies in the presence of the concrete walls in the landscape, framing distinct 
territories, and marking the limits of mobility and legal rights of Palestinians. The borders are 
also punctuated by security checkpoints where heavy surveillance dominates the passage of 
subjects across the divided territories. Patrolled by soldiers, these boundary crossing sites are 
heavily militarised, underscoring the fundamentally violent processes which inscribe forced 
limits on human movement. The border checkpoints are also sites of frequent demonstration 
and confrontation between Palestinians and Israeli border forces.  
 Borders and walls are the physical manifestation of the spatiality of Palestine as a camp, 
yet their highly visible presence is also matched by the less visible condition of legal fragility 
which requires identity to be continually screened and tested. Carrying identity documents is 
necessary at all times in public and this simple requirement institutes an inescapable 
encroachment of insecurity into all public experiences. The identity document itself also, by 
this means, obtains an even higher degree of importance since it is the means by which the 
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subject is able to exist as freely as possible within the confines of the securitised camp/state. 
The amplified importance of documentation inevitably leads to the increased impact of 
bureaucratic process on individual existence as the relative freedom of mobility implied by 
documentation remains in thrall to the administrative procedures of the state apparatus.  
 Camp-like conditions of spatiality exist for Palestinians in the multiple locations they 
inhabit in the Middle East. Palestinian refugee camps still represent a significant proportion of 
Palestinian population, amounting to a semi-permanent local diaspora in exile waiting to return 
home in accordance with the 1948 UN resolution which declares their right to be repatriated 
(Hammer, 2010). The extent of these camps, and the camp-like conditions of the Palestinian 
territories blur distinctions between state and camp. The camp takes on and must fulfil the role 
of the state for its inhabitants, whilst in Palestinian territory the state takes on the nature of a 
camp.  
  Within the overall context of investigating the experiences and stories of Palestinian 
refugees it is necessary to arrive at a conceptualization of what it means to be a refugee and 
what kind of legal and spatial conditions refugees inhabit. Being a refugee is evidently a “state,” 
a temporary (even if long-term) experience suspended between alternative states of being. 
Being a refugee always presumes the possibility of return, or progress, to a different state—
which is the citizen, the subject with rights, legal protection, society, and a home. It is partly 
because Agamben theorised the State of Exception as a state which is associated with a 
particular spatial condition—the camp—that means it is especially well suited to describing 
the condition of refugees, and the spaces they inhabit. 
 In order to begin this investigation into how the logic of the camp might be applied to 
Palestine it is first necessary to set out how Agamben defines what a camp is. His main 
formulation of the camp appears in Homo sacer: sovereign power and bare life, chapter 7, 
“The camp as the ‘nomos’ of the modern.” In that chapter Agamben approaches the question 
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“what is a camp?” not by deducing its definition from the events that happened there but instead 
by asking what its “juridico-politico structure” is—that is, what legal and political structures 
existed in the camps which allowed what happened there to happen (Agamben, 2016, p.166). 
By doing this, Agamben claims, he is able to show that the camp is not a mere “historical 
anomaly” but rather “the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we are still 
living” (Agamben, 2016, p.166).  
 Agamben’s detailed account of the Prussian and Weimar juridical systems which laid 
the basis of the Nazi concentration camps need not be relayed here—as he himself declares, 
the importance of his interpretation is that it enables the idea of the camp to be applied to 
modernity in general, not only a single, extreme, historic instance. The notion of the camp 
which can be abstracted from his text holds, fundamentally, that “the camp is the space that is 
opened when the State of Exception begins to become the rule” (Agamben, 2016, Pp.168-9). 
Furthermore, the camp spatialises a temporary suspension of law, becoming a “permanent 
spatial arrangement” which exists outside the normal legal and political order of life (Agamben, 
2016, Pp.168-9). In short, the camp is the physical enclosure within the boundaries of which 
the State of Exception exists. With the law suspended, the inside of the camp turns into what 
Agamben calls a “zone of indistinction” where, because of the lack of juridical protection, 
literally “everything had truly become possible” (since there was no law to forbid it) (Agamben, 
2016, p.171). With no law there are no rights and no crime. Whether atrocities are actually 
committed in such spaces, or if they are, how atrocious they appear, is, for Agamben, beside 
the point. The ethical disposition of the police—or whoever it is who wields power in the 
camp—may restrain them from atrocity, but the fact remains that there is no juridical or 
political restraint. In this sense Agamben is able to list as camps stadiums in which refugees 
are kept before deportation, or waiting areas in international airports where detainees are 
held—all of which are spaces in which juridical oversight is suspended indefinitely.  
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 This is the light in which Palestine can be approached as a camp, defined as a zone of 
indeterminacy in which juridico-political structures are suspended and anything, potentially, is 
possible. This proposition has held interest from a good number of researchers on Palestine 
who have drawn on Agamben’s theorization of the State of Exception to help explain the 
Palestinian situation. This has led to a series of readings and re-readings of Agamben’s work, 
testing out its applicability to the Palestinian context, and also developing it as a result to extend 
its usefulness—as well as to critique it and offer new insights. The purpose, therefore, of this 
text is to draw on available existing research, both by Agamben and by researchers on Palestine 
who have been influenced by Agamben, in order to establish Palestine in general as a “camp” 
which exists in a “State of Exception.” Conceptualizing Palestine as a camp and a space of 
exception will, in turn, provide a context in which the stories and experiences of Palestinian 
academics fleeing Palestine, can be shared, spoken about, and understood. 
 
2.2 Review of literature on Agamben’s theory of the State of Exception applied to 
Palestine  
In Palestine the State of Exception involves “both the extension of military wartime 
powers into the civil sphere, and the suspension of constitutional norms that protect individual 
liberties” (Lentin, 2017, p.2). The suspension of legal norms and the extension of military 
conditions perpetuate the indeterminacy which, for Agamben, is essential to the State of 
Exception. This indeterminate state is perpetuated through the continuously troubled relations 
of Palestine to the other spaces which border it. Specifically, in the case of Palestine, its 
condition of a State of Exception is inseparable from that of Israel—which has also been 
theorised as a State of Exception in itself. “Governed through a complex web of emergency 
legislation, and through practices of exception, emergency, necessity and security and a 
discourse of Jewish victimhood,” writes Lentin, “the State of Israel may arguably be theorised 
as a textbook example of what the Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s calls “State 
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of Exception” (Lentin, 2017, p.2). Between them, then, both Palestine and Israel constitute 
states of exception, or neighbouring “camps” whose spatial (as well as juridical and political) 
boundaries are, in themselves, highly contentious and indeterminate.  
In fact, some scholars have argued that there are credible grounds to consider 
“Israel/Palestine” as a single entity, a form of “settler colony” which is itself “a State of 
Exception, determined in large part by Israel’s urgent desire to normalise the exceptional status 
of its regime of occupation in accord with law” (Lloyd, 2012, p.75). From this point of view 
Israel persistently attempts to define Palestine within the permanent spatial order of a camp in 
which normality is suspended indefinitely.  
Yet, Lloyd has made an important critique of Agamben’s widely accepted notion of the 
State of Exception as an indeterminate zone where laws are suspended, by instead referring to 
Palestine as a “hyperregulated” state bounded by a proliferating regime “of permits, closures, 
controls, dispossessions, demolitions, all of which proceed according to a labyrinthine web of 
civil law and military decree” (Lloyd, 2012, p.75). Palestine, from this point of view, is not at 
all a zone in which the licit and the illicit become indistinguishable, but rather one in which 
laws are abundantly in evidence and actively used to transact political authority. Such a 
situation is familiar to the history of settler colonies in which normality is indeed suspended, 
so as to institute a prolonged period of emergency government which hyperregulates those 
inside the camp boundaries. Lloyd is able to refer to examples in Northern Ireland and across 
colonial Africa to substantiate the claim that within the camp bare life is kept bare by means of 
hyperregulation.  
At a fundamental level, many different scholars have accepted the claims of Agamben 
that the State of Exception represents a normalization of what was formerly exceptional. Once 
this is established it then becomes important to attempt to define how—by what means and 
through which processes—this state is maintained. Parsons and Salter, among others, have 
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focussed on the techniques and strategies which the Israeli government apparatus continually 
puts in place to maintain the status of Palestine as a State of Exception, and to detail the constant 
labour and administration which this requires. For Parsons and Salter it is the idea of the 
“border” which defines the spatial practices which keep a space in a State of Exception, and, 
indeed, which define it as a “camp.” Yet, this entails something more than simply describing 
the territorial boundaries which define the space within which the State of Exception is 
maintained. In order to understand the border as something more than a simple checkpoint, 
Parsons describes it with reference to the work of Foucault as a web of “biopolitical practices 
of mobility regulation” (Parsons & Salter, 2008, p.701). In this sense the border is “thick” with 
regulatory procedures, a time-consuming, lugubrious nexus in which the full power of the state 
to prohibit the mobility of the subject is demonstrated.  
The border, from this point of view, is a space of control defined by infrastructure, 
checkpoints, identity documents and a permit system, all of which are conceived by Parsons 
and Salter as means of enacting biopolitical control over Palestinians and regulating their 
movement. In a further article, Salter has written even more explicitly about the border as a 
space in itself which amounts to “a permanent State of Exception” (Salter, 2008, p.365). The 
border demarcates the state and inscribes the limit of sovereign power. As such it creates the 
conditions for biopolitical control of government to take place. Wherever these measures of 
control are enacted, borders are inscribed. Indeed, the border might be considered as the 
phenomenal manifestation of biopolitics. The border therefore enables to the state to 
“institutionalise a continual State of Exception at the frontier that in turn performs the spatio-
legal fiction of territorial sovereign and the sovereign subject in each admission/exclusion 
decision” (Salter, 2008, p.365). Agamben’s tendency to privilege the camp as the definitive 
topological form of the State of Exception is complicated here by a new emphasis on the 
border—an update to Agamben’s thought which is particularly relevant to Palestine, a territory 
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criss-crossed by borders. In a sense Salter’s focus on the border makes it possible to think of 
two competing spatial topologies of the camp: it could either be conceived as the extensive 
area of an indeterminate zone, or else the distinctly inscribed linear frontier or limit that 
demarcates inside/outside.  
Parsons is one of a number of writers to address the theories of Foucault on biopower 
which developed around his analysis of the population management of modern European 
nation states and which underlies much of Agamben’s own thinking (Foucault, 2014). While 
for some writers on Palestine these theories can be taken intact, for others there are important 
developments to be made. Ghanim, for example, has powerfully re-theorised the concept of 
“biopower” as “thanatopower”—that is, the management of death and destruction, rather than 
the management of life. To some extent this qualifies Agamben’s own description of the camp 
but insisting more strongly on the horizon of the continual possibility of death which is 
instituted by the camp—something which is implicit in the word “camp” but explicit in the 
concept “thanatopower.” By claiming that under colonial occupation in Palestine “the lives of 
subjects are expropriated” she argues that for the subject living in the State of Exception death 
is continually present like “a permanent shadow” (Ghanim, 2013, n.p.). What is remarkable is 
that Ghanim, like Lloyd and Lantin, is at pains to explain that biopower or thanatopower is 
“spatialised,” that is, it is inherently spatial in its dimensions. As such it does not operate in a 
vacuum, or merely on the level of ideology and representations, but is always transacted within 
particular forms of space, or topology. As Ghanim writes:  
The operation of power depends upon imaginative geographies and imaginative 
others, who are defined/produced through the ongoing demarcation of spatial and 
symbolic boundaries that separate spaces of occupation as spaces of exception from 
space of rule and normality. The physical demarcation is the material instantiation 
of a symbolic/categorical separation between the legitimate political subject of the 
citizen and the illegitimate political subject (Ghanim, 2013, n.p.). 
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 In her formulation of “thanatopower” Ghanim shifts the emphasis of Agamben’s theory 
of the State of Exception towards its production of death in the lives of those subjects whose 
lives are suspended between borders and control points in a condition of bare life within the 
camp. Death is indeed omnipresent within the State of Exception—as a threat as well as a 
reality. Yet, Hanafi has also argued that, in the case of Palestine, too much focus on casualties 
in the conflict with Israel has overshadowed other actions through which the Palestinian state 
is excepted. Again, this relates to the question of space as Hanafi defines practices of 
dispossession, occupation and destruction of Palestinian living space as a form of “spacio‐
cide,” that is, the death of space (Hanafi, 2010, p.106). In this case, Palestine as a State of 
Exception means a place which is defined by the death of space in its ordinary or normal 
condition—a space which is dispossessed, colonised, and destroyed, and therefore one in which 
ordinary life becomes impossible. After acts of “spacio-cide,” Palestine becomes an area in 
which only bare life is possible. The camp, from this conceptual vantage point, therefore 
becomes the death of space.  
 Like many of the writers discussed here, Youssef understands the experience of the 
citizen as being essential to modern statist politics. According to this view the material 
conditions of being human are overwritten by citizenship so that the material existence of 
human experience is conditioned by citizenship and, reciprocally, citizenship is always 
conditioned by the materiality of human existence (Youssef, 2007). As Lentin reminds us, “the 
State of Exception involves, on the one hand, the extension of the military authority’s wartime 
powers into the civil sphere, and on the other, the suspension of constitutional norms that 
protect individual liberties” (Lentin, 2010, n.p.). Yet, Agamben’s theory here appears 
incomplete given the absence of a developed discourse on a significant factor in the definition 
of Palestine as a camp—which is race. With reference to the work of Weheliye on biopolitics 
and race in the context of the United States, Lentin has pressed the issue of Israel as a racist 
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state whose territorial, juridical, and political borders are enforced along lines of race. State 
racism serves to separate people into distinct groups on the basis of assigned (not necessarily 
biological) race, and to then privilege one group and attempt to eradicate the other (Lentin, 
2010, n.p.). Racism in Israel/Palestine thereby becomes implicated in biopolitics, determining 
the death of some citizens (an example of thanatopower), and more broadly organizing the state 
“around the distinction between Jew and non-Jew, military and civilian legal systems, 
enclosure and movement” (El-Haj, 2009, p.30). The association of the camp with “spacio-cide” 
cannot, therefore, be disentangled from its racialization of space 
 One of the most important consequences of Agamben’s theorization of the State of 
Exception is that it has enabled further scholars to revise and extend its reach in relation to new 
subject areas, and particularly, in this case, to Palestine. Nurhan Abujidi has provided one of 
the most detailed readings of Agamben in relation to Palestine, using this specific context to 
develop the singular concept of the State of Exception into four differentiated versions. The 
rationale for granulating the State of Exception in this fashion is to come to terms with the 
fractured, and continually changing topology of Palestine—an entity whose borders, territory, 
and legal jurisdiction have all been in a continual state of change throughout the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. In response to the multiplicity of Palestinian experiences—whether 
inside Palestinian territory, or in exile, Abujidi chooses to speak of “Palestinian space” as a 
realm of experience that may exist in multiple legal and territorial frameworks (Abujidi, 2009, 
p. 274). In order to acknowledge the intrinsic spatiality of states of exception, Abujidi uses the 
expression “state/space,” and formulates four versions of it: the state/space of exile and refuge; 
the state/space of paradox; the state/space of occupation and siege; and the state/space of 
urbicide. Each one of these states/spaces serves as a way of highlighting a particular group of 
Palestinian experiences. The state/space of exile and refuge emerges out of the destruction and 
disappearance of Palestinian territories, the loss of possessions and life, and the exiling of 
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many. As a result Palestine, as a whole, has disappeared and now only exists as an “existential 
and epistemological condition,” or “state of being” (Abujidi, 2009, p.274). The state/space of 
paradox refers to exactly the same elision of Israel/Palestine described by Lloyd above, a 
reflection of the disjunction between the two overlapping, yet totally separated worlds: 
“modern, well-planned Jewish colonies overlooking the strangulated Palestinian urban areas 
with their vernacular architecture and landscape” (Abujidi, 2009, p.274). States / spaces of 
occupation and siege are embodied in the topography of the West Bank, where small pockets 
of land lie outside the main flows and networks shaping the territory—“consequently they 
appear alien even in their own natural setting, and serve to naturalise the presence of their 
conqueror” (Abujidi, 2009, p.275). States/spaces of urbicide represent an escalation of 
states/spaces of occupation, experiencing permanent states of invasion and military control as 
described by Hanafi, above.  
 Each of these states/spaces helps to more finely differentiate the spatial conditions of 
the State of Exception embodied in the camp when the “camp” is thought about as Palestine 
itself. This is independent of the actual refugee camps which exist within Palestine and beyond 
its borders. These camps may be considered camps within camps. The sheer spatial stress (what 
Abujidi refers to as “strangulation”) experienced in Palestine is undoubtedly intensely realised 
within Abujidi’s work (as in many others’). Yet, Abujidi raises an important concern which 
has not so far been raised, which is the story of resistance waged by Palestinians to the 
conditions in the “camp” of Israel/Palestine—a theme notably missing from Agamben’s work, 
which perhaps too exclusively focuses on the victims of the State of Exception, without 
attending to their shaping of the reality of the camp through politics or civil or armed struggle. 
As Abujidi notes, Palestinians’ struggle and resistance “has been powerful and effective” and 
this also must be considered within the paradigm of the camp (Abujidi, 2009, p.288).  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction: methodology as an end not only a means  
 
The methodological approach employed in this dissertation is a strategic part of the argument 
as well as practically oriented towards the ends of gathering data and analysing it. The 
methodology embodies an approach towards defining what knowledge is and how it relates to 
the subject and this is key to the project overall. Methodology is conceived here of as an active 
component in shaping the overall effects of the research which is not subordinate to the purpose 
of the main ideas and arguments but is itself an implementation of the key interventions of this 
project. That is to say, the relationships established in the methodology between myself as the 
researcher, data and epistemological content are themselves a playing out of the fundamental 
claims which this dissertation will make. This approach follows in the wake of what have been 
called “experimental methodologies”, methodologies which aim to “systematically de-
familiarise and displace historical objects in a manner which encourages us to imagine, engage 
with, and make sense of the past anew” (Forrest, 2008, p.11). I also aim to extend this and de-
familiarise and displace not only the past, but the present as well.  
In the light of this, researcher, data and epistemological content are not treated as 
arbitrary conventions to help realise more lofty goals—rather they are treated as the processes 
in which the goals of the dissertation may be realised.  In practical terms, what this means is 
that conventional distinctions between the researcher as a disinterested observer, data as 
objective facts, and the epistemological relationship between them will be challenged. The 
rationale behind this challenge is that methodological conventions may instantiate regimes of 
knowledge and practice defined by borders, just as physical territory and human subjects are, 
in the world, in some cases, also defined by strictly protected and reinforced borders which 
allow some figures to pass, while withholding access to others. The definition of 
27 
epistemological “fields” makes explicit this analogy between areas of qualitative research and 
physical territories. In other words, different methodological positions (for example, positivism 
verses constructionism) occupy different, and frequently antagonistic, ways of understanding 
with strict boundaries between them.  
Foucault referred to the relationship of power to knowledge in precisely this way, 
arguing that academic disciplines and fields of study were not essential, natural expressions of 
the way things are but instead institutionally-reinforced orders serving to impose the interests 
of the state. Cultural theorist Stuart Hall explained Foucault’s argument about the purpose and 
place of knowledge in the following terms:  
knowledge was put to work through discursive practices in specific institutional 
settings to regulate the conduct of others by means of apparatuses—‘discourses, 
institutions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophic propositions, morality, philanthropy’ 
all of which instantiated ‘strategies of relations of forces supporting and supported 
by types of knowledge’ (Hall, 1997, p.47). 
 
Methodologies can be added to this list and the claim made that a methodology as much as a 
field describes a particular configuration of power. Put another way, this means that 
methodologies are not means to an end but are themselves an end since they operationalise 
socio-political powers. Thus, by challenging methodological conventions the researcher also 
challenges discourses and power. There is much at stake, therefore, in the selection and 
deployment of a methodology.  
 
3.2 Methodology and orthodoxy  
Studies of social science research methodologies have conventionally revolved around the 
question of whether the world of human society happens to have a fixed reality independent of 
our conceptions of it (Ashmore & Woolgar, 1989). This question reaches deeply into the 
history of social science and has contributed to subsequent debates centring around objectivity 
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and positivism, and subjectivity and constructivism. Within the objectivist and positivist 
traditions the distance of the researcher from the subject of research and data collected is 
considered paramount and “assumes that a neutral observer discovers data in a unitary external 
world” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018, p.365). The objective of positivist research has 
conventionally been “explanation, control, and prediction, looking for the verification of 
hypothesis, facts, and laws, thereby accumulating knowledge through cause and effect and 
generalization,” while any action related to the research is minimised in order to limit the 
involvement of any activity perceived as subjective and a threat to objectivity and validity 
(Yanow, & Schwartz-Shea, 2015, p.30). The objective or positivist research philosophy may 
also be historicised to the late seventeenth century when Descartes first formulated his 
penetrating and highly influential critique of sensory perception as an means of knowledge, 
doubting everything except the operation of abstract reason (Descartes, Cottingham & 
Williams, 2017). The emergence of the absolute sovereign, the first systematic attempts at 
modern census taking, and the development of cadastral maps for improved taxation, as well 
as the establishment of new formal institutions for the observation and regulation of language, 
health, education, crime, and academic knowledge emerged at the same time. Foucault’s 
exemplary study of the prison in Discipline and Punish heralded a new paradigm in which a 
spatial construction served as the vehicle for an entire system of governmentality to be imposed 
upon the population of subjects whose lives were controlled within its regime (Foucault, 2012).  
 Objectivity and quantification are inextricable: it was, for example, accurate 
quantification of people and boundaries, which allowed the early modern European states to 
extend their power over their populations. This leads us to understand that objective, 
quantitative methodologies have origins in distinct political formations, even if they were later 
on declared to owe more to a scientific instinct for verifiable truths they cannot be considered 
innocent of potential manipulation by states in ways that subjectivist methods of observation 
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(at least historically) were not (a distinction brought out by anthropological studies of state 
power in early modern Europe by, for example, Scott, 1998). Within current academic 
literature, quantitative research is defined as “the systematic examination of social phenomena, 
using statistical models and mathematical theories to develop, accumulate, and refine the 
scientific knowledge base” (Mizrahi & Davis, 2008, vol. III, p.492). The claims of quantitative 
research in this academic context are precision, objectivity, and generalizable findings on the 
basis of “hypothesis testing, using large samples, standardised measures, a deductive approach, 
and rigorously structured data collection instruments” (Mizrahi & Davis, 2008, vol. III, p.492). 
The subjectivity of the researcher is inevitably, and purposefully excluded from the research 
process, coded as an interference, an alien particle liable to distort the accuracy and reliability 
of results with their presence (Mizrahi & Davis, 2008, vol. III, p.492).  
 The history of objectivity, positivism, and quantitative research is evidently an 
enormous topic with great complexity and any attempt to formulate it in a neat summary would 
risk reducing its actual internal variety. In terms of the current research, what is most crucial is 
not so much the broader history of those terms but a much narrower articulation of objectivity 
as a hegemonic methodological position which tends to exclude any explicit articulation of the 
researcher’s own subjectivity or consider itself, as Kuhn and Yazawa have shown, quantitative 
research frequently tends to exclude any explicit articulation of the researcher’s own 
subjectivity (Kuhn & Yazawa, 2015). By removing the researcher from the equation, 
quantitative/positivist research lays claims to form of “pure research” which is not affected by 
the presence of the researcher and does not factor the researcher’s own position into its analysis 
and conclusion (Kuhn & Yazawa, 2015, p.293). Any cursory survey of contemporary social 
science research will reveal that the “I” of the author as a situated, embodied presence is 
generally excluded in favour of a disembodied voice without a clearly acknowledged position 
(Martin, 2001; Winch, 2014). The resulting discourse is assumed to derive objective authority 
30 
from this standpoint, whereas (as critical postcolonial and subaltern scholars have clearly 
pointed out) it too often corresponds to a false universalism identical with Western academic 
hegemony (see, for example, Spivak, 1988). Rather than an explicitly articulated doctrine of 
objectivity, we are talking more about a habit of mind, a shared agreement to exclude 
subjectivity.  
 These methodological characteristics are not merely indications of procedure, they 
represent the outlines of a theory of knowledge itself, what constitutes it, and how it is produced 
and reproduced. Auguste Comte’s formulation of the doctrine of “positivism” as a privileging 
of observable facts and relationships grounds an entire paradigm of research within the 
apparatus just outlined, conceiving of the realm of human society as a field of knowledge which 
can be accurately inquired into through objective means which maintain strict separations 
between the object to be studied and the researcher studying it (Comte & Lenzer, 2010). 
Logical positivism, the claim of certainty as deriving from logical deductions from principle to 
principle, requires this separation, and is also positioned within the positivist conceptualization 
of what knowledge and research are (Ayer, 1981). In all such formulations, the subjective 
represents that which must be excluded in order for the truth to emerge. What is perhaps more 
pernicious than the ideal of objectivity as a scientific practice is rather the idea of “value-free” 
research—that is, research which is carried out by researchers who profess to have freed their 
apparatus from their own values. Cunningham has critiqued this claim at length, drawing on 
the classic formulation of Weber that: 
the significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this 
significance cannot . . . be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of analytical 
laws . . . however perfect it may be, since the significance of cultural events pre-
supposes a value-orientation towards these events (Weber, 1949, 81; see also 
Cunningham, 2017).  
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It is the professing of “value-free” objectivity in research, with its implicit 
diminishment of subjective value, which my research questions, moving in a different 
direction, evading claims of certainty derived from principles and laws, precisely because these 
are the conceptions upon which the very states which enact oppressive measures against myself 
and others represented in my research, are founded. Thus, these ideas are pertinent to my study 
because they delineate forms of discourse, knowledge, and power which I am attempting to 
question by developing alternative methodologies.  
 
3.3 Transgression of methodological orthodoxy 
The geopolitical position of myself as the researcher undoubtedly influences the research and 
cannot be excluded. Rather than a “value-free” approach to research this is instead an approach 
that positions itself within a distinct value system, which recognises that values are indeed the 
very things at stake—the value of a subject, the value of their rights, the value of their 
experience. In the light of this, the position and approach the research takes is deliberately 
transgressive in the way it refuses to make distinctions between data, epistemological content 
and myself as the researcher. The turn towards subjectivism is in part a move to make the object 
speak—that is, to make myself, a Palestinian, an exile, a subject who has experienced the state 
of exception, have a voice. The stripping of rights which characterises the state of exception 
and leads to its lawlessness is in effect the stripping away of a subject to an object which can 
be disposed of by whatever means. Under those conditions, non-objectivity is a form of 
survival.  
The methodology proposed here therefore deliberately transgresses the distinctions 
between researcher, data and epistemological content. It does this by locating myself, the 
researcher, at the critical juncture of the work, restoring the subject to the centre of research 
from the periphery where it had been consigned in social science research performed from the 
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relative comfort of Western academies which afforded—with some exceptions—the very 
possibility of objectivity which is impossible from the position of the researcher situated within 
the state of exception (note key sources in the references discussed above-e.g. Martin (2001) 
and Winch (2014), originate from within Western academic systems). The role of the 
researcher depicted in conventional ethnographic studies resonates with some clarity in my 
own work in that it brings into the foreground questions of subjectivity. Denscombe has called 
for there to be “a public account of the self that describes the researcher’s self”, a double 
reflexivity which attempts not to hide the researcher and obliterate their subjective presence 
but instead to bring that position out into the open and share it publicly as a crucial part of the 
social contingency of research, contingency which ultimately makes the work more specific 
and situated (Denscombe, 2014, p.89).  
In this way the subjectivity of the researcher, as located and articulated by a range of 
overlapping contexts, including the geopolitical context, the theoretical context and the 
personal context of individual experience, functions as both the researcher, data, and 
epistemological content of the work. In a radical inversion of the logic of positivism, 
knowledge is not something that is distinguishable from data, data collection and the 
researcher. Rather knowledge is framed as an intervention in discourses of power, that is, an 
attempt to shift the boundaries of what it is possible to say about a subject, something that was 
powerfully demonstrated in relation to the history and culture of the Middle East in relation to 
the West by Said’s classic Orientalism (Said, 1978). Knowledge is presented not as objective 
data distinct from its articulation by a subject, rather it is a gesture within a particular regime 
of knowledge to challenge the limits of what is assumed to be the way things are. The 
background to this basis process of re-reading the observable world (both past and present) is 
strongly set out by the critical heritage of postcolonial theory has, from many different 
directions offered ways to “decolonise the mind”, that is, to rid it of its inherited assumptions 
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about what knowledge is, and present alternative narratives situated in alternative places and 
voices, disavowing the existence of a single, objective position from which to describe the 
world (Ngugi, 1986). Robert Young’s White mythologies, for example, is one of the most 
comprehensive critiques of the “mythologization” of history from the point of view of white 
suprematism, drawing on critical, philosophical writing by Sartre, Spivak, and Foucault to 
demonstrate how the colonial world has been constructed in the image of the coloniser, and 
how postcolonial thinkers have consistently challenged this point of view (Young, 2008).  
It is by means of the narrative story, which forms the chief methodological motivation 
of this project—that data and researcher become inseparable. The narrative account told in the 
first person makes observation and observer identical: it is always clear that the observations 
and critiques that constitute my discourse issue out of my own position and perspective. 
Furthermore, theory is not something that acts as a neutral explanatory tool, instead theory is 
the means by which knowledge and the researcher are identifiable.  Theory is that which 
identifies, defines and articulates the experiences of the researcher, which is also the data, and 
the meaning of subject matter that is being studied and presented. It is for this reason that the 
research takes the radical step of blending narrative storytelling with critical theory. 
Conventionally held to be separate genres or even epistemologies (that is, ways of knowing), 
storytelling and theoretical critique and interpretation, within the methodology proposed here, 
are inter-articulated. Within the stories are episodes of theoretical inquiry in which the work of 
relevant critical thinkers are included and interpreted because the basis of this project is that 
any narrative embedded within an individual subject has theoretical qualities and insight which 
are usually left latent but in this work will be voiced as part of the narrative. In other words, 
theory is often left by fiction writers to critics and theorists, whereas in the work presented here 
I take on the dual role of both narrator and theorist.  
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A similar (but inverse) example might be seen in the work of the historian Michel-
Rolph Trouillot whose historical investigations of the history of Haiti are framed and 
interspersed with personal narratives, reflections, and stories, showing that the work of history 
is always a process of storytelling (Trouillot, 2015). Even where objectivity exists as a real goal 
of the research, it cannot be falsely separated from the act of relating it in narratives. In real 
terms these methodological concepts translate into my own experience as a father, a husband 
and a scholar from Palestine, with a family, articulated according to the borders that are 
determined by forces in the geopolitical arena of contemporary history beyond my control, 
which hold my life in suspension.  
Rather than exclude these forces from the research process as so much extraneous 
matter, they are instead incorporated as the data and epistemological content of the dissertation 
whose ideal expression is now not the conventional forms of reporting characteristics of the 
social sciences but instead an alternative device: the story. 
Within social anthropology storytelling has been offered as a way to re-route the 
historical emphasis on positivism and objectivism (Maynes, Pierce, & Laslett, 2008). Stories 
do not necessarily or inevitably provide forms of knowledge that guarantee specific certainties 
as more orthodox methodologies attempt to do, but rather, the story as a methodology poses 
questions, problematises certainties, emphasises the importance of contingency in relation to 
meaning, and foregrounds the critical analysis of situated experience over a stable 
epistemological regime. Writing of the methodological practice of “narrative inquiry,” Trahar 
states that “all stories are composed in a context, replete with history and with culture. Within 
that context, certain stories may be favoured over others and will be told in ways congruent 
with the context” (Trahar, 2013, xi). Narrative inquiry selects stories (fictional stories, or 
sometimes life stories) told within cultural contexts for study and interpretation and this 
provides a useful example of how stories can be adapted to scholarly investigation; however, 
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the present research is not based on describing stories which already exist as cultural objects, 
but rather in actively using the narrative mode as a means of investigation.  
 In formulating an approach to situated experience as a methodological strategy, this 
dissertation avows direct connection to a series of epistemological interventions into, and 
against, the regime of positivism and the paramountcy of objectivity. Opposed to positivist 
quantitative studies, qualitative research privileges the insider’s (or, “emic”) view in contrast 
to the outsider’s (or, “etic”) view (Given, 2008, p.249). Qualitative research is also person-
centred rather than variable-centred (Ely, 2006, p.329). Qualitative research is, furthermore, 
holistic, sensitive to the particular and contingent, not rigidly controlled, and steered towards 
complexity rather than simplification and extrapolation to laws and generalisable truths 
(Padget, 2008). Indeed, the very notion of “truth” at stake is widely different from that at stake 
in positivist experimentation. In contrast to the research world described by Padget (2008), in 
my work it is the multiplicity of world views and perspectives, the multiplicity of truths, the 
partiality of truth, the semblance of truth deriving from the differentiation of subjectivities 
which is intrinsic to the project. Whereas Padget describes an approach based on laws and 
generalities, for my work the qualitative methodology and the individual subjectivity of the 
researcher or researchers is treated as preeminent in relation to the specific and contingent 
subjectivities of those who are subjects of the study. These are then all brought into play, 
rejecting the implication of purity or validity of an ideal point of view from which all 
differences may be totalised and simplified described by Pernecky (Pernecky, 2016). Padget’s 
and Pernecky’s descriptions of positivist methodology are therefore significant in providing 
foils which highlight the new valuation of subjectivity and contingency in my own work. 
 My own work carried out at Lincoln University through a Master’s in Creative Writing 
(2013-2014) was crucial in formulating a balance between creative practice and critical 
analysis—a doubleness which becomes apparent in the interlacing of theory with first person 
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narrative. Studying within a community of fellow writers encouraged a sensitivity to audience 
and the critical potential of empathy as a means of establishing intersubjective relationships 
with the reader. In fact, reading my work aloud (a practice encouraged at Lincoln) enabled me 
to understand my writing within the long tradition of oral histories—something I was able to 
connect with in a new way by means of the video narrative which illustrates my stories and 




3.4 Arts based research  
The story as methodology radically inverts the conventional logic of research in the social 
sciences as it appropriates the strategies of the aesthetic as methods for the investigation of the 
social. Traditionally the aesthetic might have entered into research as data, but never as an 
apparatus of investigation in itself (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018). Art itself used to be studied but 
it was not something that we can study other fields with. Yet, as a particular sub-field within 
qualitative research, arts-based research derives its radical nature from the means by which it 
reverses the traditional order of methodological apparatus and data. Leavy, for example, speaks 
of arts-based research as “carving out” new modes of research from within the existing field of 
qualitative research (Leavy, 2015). Recent theoretical and critical discourse on the place of the 
arts within research has begun to challenge existing notions of what constitutes a methodology. 
In Wimpenny and Savin-Baden’s edited volume, for example, it is proposed that in arts-based 
research art is both the methodology and the data (Wimpenny & Savin-Baden, 2014). Visual, 
verbal, audio, dramatic and performative aesthetic practices are all deployed strategically as 
modes of investigation and research (Barone & Eisner, 2012). Justifying these new kinds of 
research practice is essential to the present project because the research will bring together 
cultural artefacts from a range of genres, incorporating a video which will play a role in 
reconstructing and capturing the experience of displacement and boundary crossing. Critical 
arts-based research studies are crucial in this respect since they provide an underlying belief in 
the power of multiple artefacts to interpret events. Critical sociological accounts of literature 
are common in the wake of the social turn within literary criticism, and have accorded written 
language, among other sign systems or symbolic behaviours, a crucial role in the mediation of 
experience (Kharbe, 2009, 205ff). Yet, critical potentiality of the story as an investigative 
advice for social science contexts has not yet been fully exploited and research in this paradigm 
remains experimental, a situation demonstrated by the need for arts-based research studies to 
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continue to justify themselves and argue for their acceptance in the wider fields of sociology, 
anthropology, and cultural studies (Barone & Eisner, 2012). 
3.5 Creative Writing  
For my research, the story offers an ideal vehicle through which to investigate the 
experiential data of my own experiences of the spaces, regimes, and epistemologies which 
articulate control through boundaries and which are the subject of my work. In other words, 
the stories represent the data so my own experience can be documented. 
This work inherently transgresses the limits of a single discipline and its limited 
epistemological framework since the stories I will use deal explicitly with geopolitical events 
in relation to cultural and legal theory. This approach clearly overlaps with the project of 
autoethnography in its concern with “the positionality of the researcher and the situatedness of 
the analysis” (Castree, Kitchin, & Rogers, 2013, s.v. “autoethnography”). However, it is 
radically distinct because it is not a study of human behaviour or “ethnos” inherent to a 
community for its own sake; it is much more about harnessing narratives of the self as a strategy 
to investigate larger power structures which have relevance outside of the narrow band of my 
own experience. As Shaun McNiff has demonstrated, the dissolution of disciplinary boundaries 
and conventions is characteristic of arts-based research, whose constitution is itself 
transdisciplinary (McNiff, 2018, p.24). As a result, “methods respond to problems in unique 
and pragmatic ways and are not to be constrained by fixed and sanctioned protocols” McNiff, 
2018, p.24). Unconstrained, arts-based research methodologies hold out the promise of 
investigation free from pre-determined expectations about the conclusions to be reached, and 
a particular willingness for fundamental notions to be dispensed with, critiqued, or revised 
during the course of the research. 
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 Part of the appeal of drawing on theory through storytelling is the possibility of 
“empathetic engagement” (Leavy, 2018, p.194). Cultivating empathy has begun to emerge as 
a research methodology. “When we learn about people and their situations,” writes Leavy, 
there is the possibility of enlarging out understanding of the world. We may become more 
understanding, tolerant, and open to the needs and perspectives of those with whom we share 
differences” (Leavy, 2018, p.194). The introduction of empathy into theory through stories is 
a key facet of this research and in establishing a revised relationship between research, 
researcher, and reader. Through stories and theories, I am trying to pose questions, 
problematise certainties, emphasise the importance of contingency in relation to meaning.  
Stories are methodologies. This is the proposition I am putting forward under the terms of 
this thesis. The stories I present connect to the stories of other writers in wider and wider circles 
around me, stories which encompass both fictions and theories. Stories are also themselves 
theories. Despite being narratives of my life, my stories are also places to engage with theories, 
to test them against real life experience, and to find the limits of what they are able to explain. 
To that extent stories are also epistemologies, since each story is itself a new way of knowing. 
Foucault defined epistemology as the study of “epistemes”, fields of knowledge codified by 
ingrained practices and norms which tended to emanate from an apparatus of power presiding 
over that field and disciplining its contents into conformity with a governing norm (Foucault, 
2013, p.191). Usually the kind of knowledge (the “epistemology”) embedded in research data 
is considered different from the kind of knowledge, or epistemology, which defines the 
researcher and the research process. As Hughes, writes, “every research tool or procedure is 
inextricably embedded in commitments to particular visions of the world and to knowing that 
world” (Hughes, 1990, p.11). But I am trying to collapse these two distinct epistemologies and 
say instead that there can be no true separation between them. The epistemology of the story is 
also the epistemology of myself as researcher and writer of that story.  
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One way to describe this methodological position would be “autoethnography”: “an 
approach to doing and representing social research that uses personal experience to create a 
representation of cultural experiences, social expectations, and shared beliefs, values, and 
practices” (Adams & Jones, 2018, p.142). An autoethnography effects a radical re-centring of 
the researcher in the middle of overlapping geopolitical and theoretical contexts. Data, data 
collection, and data analysis become inseparable within the medium of the story itself. Yet, 
again, as stated above, this is a critical and theoretical study into the experiences of 
displacement and the states of exception which result, not the “ethnic” history of a particular 
group of people. Whilst a critical analysis of my subjectivity within my research is a key part 
of the research methodology, this does not mean that I am the research goal. That, instead, lies 
outside of my own story and this necessitates and justifies the experimental interweaving of 
stories with theories which will be found in the work that follows.  
It is useful in that respect to add a note on the process of composition of these stories. Together 
they represent the consolidation of a lengthy period of writing and reflection in many different 
places, under quite different circumstances, and often by disparate means. While the ultimate 
assembly of these fragmentary origins has taken place within a relatively fixed and stable 
academic environment I have gone through many separate operations. This has involved 
gathering and sorting my own notes collected ad hoc throughout my journey which were 
composed sometimes with only a vague sense of the form in which they would eventually take 
shape. These fragments have then been interleaved with my readings in theory so that a sense 
of dialectic has emerged through which my own experiences are submitted to the theoretical 
speculations of critical writers, which in turn has reflected back onto my own process and 
enabled me to edit or expand my own thoughts. The process of composition has also been 
played out through a broader engagement with non-text-based media essential to the 
documentation of experience. In some case this relates to specific objects which have become 
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carriers of meaning in their own right (my passport, for instance), or images (especially 
photographs). In dealing with these artefacts I have worked more in the manner of a curator 
than an author, assembling, organizing, and arranging the images and objects in order to map 
out and visualise my experience before committing it to words. In this sense the text does not 
represent the entirety of experience, but rather the guiding thread or connective substance that 
ties everything together into narratives. At the end of the stories I reopen my creative output to 
non-text-based media through the incorporation of a video piece, for which I provide an 
additional critical commentary.   
3.6 Stories, education, identity 
Stories as methodology and stories as epistemology change what education within this context 
now means, occurring at the juncture of critical experience and situated epistemology. This is 
a radically transgressive model of education because it confuses and confounds the 
conventional boundaries which have been setup to protect the supposed purity of each 
academic discipline and its corresponding orthodoxy. This view of education furthermore 
challenges orthodox constructions of what education itself is assumed to be, namely, a formal 
institutionally prescribed and validated processes that leads to certification, access to certain 
markets of opportunity, and which frequently justifies systematic discrimination based on 
class, race, gender and other forms of identification (ideas widely represented in the critical 
literature on education, for example Kassem, Mufti, & Robinson, 2006). To that extent the 
education system serves the interest of social reproduction and maintains an exclusionary effect 
on social groups already marginalised by the system without offering a truly egalitarian 
opportunity to address systematic inequities.  
 The destabilization of conventional epistemological regimes embedded in disciplinary 
formations and standardised methodologies also has an effect on the way that identity itself is 
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understood. The stories which will feature within this research project are in many ways 
centrally concerned with the production of identity—how identities are produced and 
reproduced both through the physical territories that subjects pass through, or are confined 
within, as by the epistemologies we have at our disposal to construe them with. Corresponding 
to the positivist position on the truth of the external world being singular, fixed, and subject to 
control, verification, and immutable laws, identity itself is also understood to be essential and 
innate, policed by inflexible classificatory boundaries. Yet, as a scholar and educator from 
Palestine I know too well how these classificatory regimes adversely confine the subject within 
rigid systems of law that restrict access to change and mutability. Conditionality, not fixity, is 
rather the more accurate representation of being within geopolitical realities and it is finally 
therefore through a methodology which permits contingency that the complex experiences of 
subjectivity can be more freely investigated. It is for this reason that an arts-based research 
methodology focussed on stories has been selected for this research. 
 
3.7 Stories and ethics 
The stories which constitute this research narrate a series of experiences and journeys of myself 
and my family over a period of time and across multiple geographies. While these stories are 
framed as “my” stories, they are also “our” stories in the sense that they record and document 
the life of a family involving multiple generations. In contrast to the majority of participant-
observer immersive studies in anthropology, I, as researcher, am not foreign to the community 
in which I have worked (for example, the immersive anthropology of de Sardan in de Sardan, 
2013). The key ethical issues in participant-observer anthropology have revolved around the 
problematic fact that the researcher is not “of” the people whom she or he studies and is 
therefore liable to “rupture” the community by their sheer presence (Hamilton, 2016). 
Objective social studies entail objectification: issues of ethics emerge where the researcher 
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risks exposing communities to the gaze of outsiders without having at their disposal and 
adequate means of consent (Plemmons & Barker, 2017). Clearly I have consented to myself to 
represent myself, having determined that the inevitable exposure of my life and experience to 
a level of scrutiny is necessary for a better picture of the experience of a Palestinian academic 
to be portrayed. Where other friends or non-family members appear in the stories it has not 
been necessary to specify any factual details about their identities and they are to all extents 
and purposes anonymous. If this were an “objective” study deploying “quantitative” facts many 
details would have to be divulged of my journey and that of my family, potentially exposing 
their lives to public scrutiny in ways that would raise ethical problems. I have chosen to not 
present such details as a forensic documentation of our experience has not been the aim of this 
work. It has rather been to analyse through narrative and theoretical reflection moments of 
direct confrontation with the state of exception, whilst protecting the individual members of 
my family from overt exposure.  
 Change in the political situation of Palestine is not without risk. It is at such a time of 
unstable history that the ethics of individual experience and the state of political crisis must be 
seen alongside one another. Alternative approaches might have been to investigate more 
aggressively specific institutions or bodies who have served to institute the state of exception, 
but I have judged this too dangerous an endeavour. I have instead put forward the above 
argument on the nature of subjective versus objective research in order to substantiate the basic 
ethical claim that the documented experience of an individual subject represents, in however 




The following chapters will now present the three stories which constitute the main research 
of this project: “A stranger in my home town,” “An unforgettable day,” and “Life in Chester.” 
Each of these stories stands alone in its own right, while they also read as a group of three, 
exploring common themes and concerns, as well as their shared approach to methodology 
described above. The production of these three stories has followed three major transition 
points in my own experience: my early experience of displacement upon leaving Kuwait as a 
child, the death of my father, and the beginning of a new life in the UK. If the first two 
narratives explore systems of deconstruction, the third explores a system of reconstruction. 
Their arrangement is chronological though their development is circular: while they illustrate 
a progression of time the issues they investigate do not develop in a linear fashion. Instead they 
return and recur, enabling the three stories to serve as three distinct angles of approach to a 
common problem. While they can also be read without the critical introduction of the previous 
three chapters on literature and methodology, it makes sense to present them now in light of 
the earlier work which, it is hoped, will elucidate their inner construction and contribute 
positively to their interpretation in a fuller context. Following the three stories I present an 
additional research intervention, related to the stories, in the form of a video piece, along with 
a critical commentary which teases out its relationship to the foregoing work, and bringing the 






A stranger in my home town 
My identification, the small green paper, which may mean nothing to any British 
person, is one of the most, if not the most, important documents in my whole life. I was 
born in Kuwait and, as such, I did not have the right to obtain the identification of my home 
country because I was not born there. Those who are born outside Palestine are not entitled 
to have an ID and struggle for years to get one, provided that they apply to the Israeli 
authorities in a process that may last 10s of years. They struggle for an identity provided 
by the state. In a world where so many people now struggle against the state—against its 
oppressive individualism of the human subject, against the disciplinary regimes, against 
the identities it imposes—we were desperate for its recognition. We are caught between 
this desire to have our identities recognised by the state and, as Agamben (2013) has 
explained, a contrary desire to exist as a community of belonging without resorting to 
identity which is too easily co-opted by the state. Without our IDs we had, in an important 
sense, no identity. At the time this led us to desperate attempts to attain it—but as I reflect 
now I consider something else: that without IDs we had also become free of identity: we 
were a community of beings without identities. 
In fact, I find passports a most interesting kind of book, and I am someone for whom 
books mean a lot. In fact I could not make a sense of the events I have lived through and 
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the stories I have heard if it were not for books. When I was in Kuwait, I began to study 
and over time I became a researcher, a writer, a teacher and an academic. This vocation 
has stayed with me wherever I have gone. When circumstances forced me to leave my 
place of work and travel, I carried on thinking and reading following what philosophers 
Deleuze and Guttari (1987) call “Lines of flights” in my mind, crossing over territories 
both imaginary and real. The landscape is stratified, Kuwait, Iraq, Palestine and the UK; 
all of these places are marked with the channels and paths of my journeys and the obstacles 
I have faced. As I reflect on these landscapes, I begin to find that mind is also a landscape 
striated by lines of travel, fight and experience. My passport is a book that tells a story, but 
there are other books whose writing has also marked my journey and I would not be telling 
my story completely if I did not refer to them. To cross the borders of a country, I need a 
passport, and to cross the borders of mind I need books. This story is about both.  
I would like to begin by framing the story I am going to tell. It is a story about 
myself and others close to me, but it is also a story about a particular kind of subjectivity 
in the world which is in an important sense against, outside of, or excluded by the world. 
By “the world” I mean the state, the governing apparatus of the nation. Born in one state 
yet belonging another, while at the same time unable to live properly in my home country, 
I did not fit into the kinds of community which states prefer to deal with. Giorgio Agamben 
(2013) has written that every idea of community sets criteria of exclusion as much as 
criteria of inclusion. Every individual must have a definite identity because every 
individual must be identifiable by the state. Identity is not—or at least in Agamben’s view, 
is not, a positive quality, trait, or value which we ought to celebrate in ourselves and each 
other but more like a brand that makes us available to the operation of the state apparatus. 
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Belonging can be thought of as kinship, as ties of blood, family, loyalty, security, and so 
on—but belonging to the state, though it may connote or confer these myths, is 
fundamentally about being co-opted into the state’s regime of identification. But my story 
is about being outside such processes of identification, or rather, existing on the boundary 
between states and identifications—a boundary where the power to identify and disidentify 
are revealed and experienced. The radical part of Agamben’s idea about identity is not what 
I have described here; it is rather the escape route he provides out of the state’s co-optation. 
What if we had no identity? What if we were simply a “whatever,” an “anything,” resistant 
to identity? What if we could not belong, if we were pure singularity, if we could not be 
assimilated to a larger whole? With no identity there is no belonging, and with no belonging 
there is no society. And “as such,” Agamben writes, the “whatever” singularities “disavow 
the logic and workings of sovereignty.” 
So, let me begin in 1992, after the geopolitical turmoil of operation Desert Storm, 
my father decided to leave Kuwait and travel across the North West border to Iraq, despite 
having a very good job at the best university in Kuwait. Because of the support of President 
Arafat showed to the Iraqi people during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the 
Palestinian people in Kuwait began facing a lot of pressure to leave Kuwait where more 
than 750,000 Palestinians were living within its narrow borders. Our lives were caught up 
in a political atmosphere that was far outside of our control. The border around is became 
palpable, and this limits under which we ultimately lived, which are forgotten in ordinary 
life, began to feel real. Because of the pressure we felt from the Kuwaitis, especially the 
government, we decided to move to Iraq where we lived subsequently for four years. Our 
options were limited at that time; most of the families left to Iraq, Yemen and the Sudan.  
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I still remember that I cried a lot when we arrived at Safwan, the crossing point 
between Iraq and Kuwait. It was an intensely personal experience for me. It felt traumatic 
to leave the place in which I had grown up and enjoyed so many of the formative 
experiences of my life up to that point. There was a little I could say to put my feelings in 
words. In the absence of words, I cried. I was 16 and had that feeling of going to the 
unknown. My father drove to Baghdad, the capital, and we went to a house that was rented 
for us by a friend. It was a really spacious house especially when you compare it to the flat 
in which we used to live in Kuwait where Palestinians did not have the right to own 
properties. We went to explore the city the next day.  
We were amazed of the magnificence of Baghdad. We spent the whole day walking 
and enjoying the monuments of Baghdad. I could smell heritage in the streets of Baghdad. 
We did not know how ancient the city was at that time. Our daily life was very simple. It 
was the summer holiday and we had nothing to do, so we kept going to restaurants, 
cinemas, stadiums and parks. Things were very cheap for those who came from Kuwait. 
One Kuwaiti dinar was 3.3 US dollar and 1 dollar was more than 400 Iraqi dinar. To 
understand this in a better way, we just need to know that before the Iraq invasion of 
Kuwait, the Iraqi dinar was 3.3 US dollar.  
It was tough to settle quickly and make new friends but because of the large number 
of Palestinians who travelled to Iraq, we started our new life by being introduced to Iraqi 
people through Palestinians who had arrived to Iraq before we did. Iraqi people received 
Palestinians in general in a very good way. They welcomed us as they have been 
sympathising with the Palestinian people for many years. As for my family, our Iraqi 
neighbours were really kind. They started visiting us the next day we arrived and they 
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offered help in teaching us many things. Their enthusiasm in explaining almost everything 
in the area was really overwhelming and very touching. One of the families brought us 
lunch for 3 consecutive days, and when we tried to tell them that they did not need to do 
that, they said that refusing their food meant that we were not interested in being their 
friends. They were very generous, and the food was a symbol of that friendliness and 
kindness.  
We were different and yet the same, displaced, but made to feel at home. Since this 
time, in the other places I have travelled, and within the other communities I have lived, 
the power of this acceptance by the Iraqis appears more and more special. Like anyone 
who lives in a condition of dispersal from their origins, I asked myself the question which 
Toni Morrison has stated so aptly: “in what direction, at what distance . . . might there be 
a ‘home’ of safety and dignity for the peoples of historical drift, political degradation, and 
cultural displacement?” Finding acceptance is not easy. Difference and deference slip into 
one another. As a guest the views of the Other must often be deferred to, even when they 
are unacceptable. As Homi Bhabha says: “we defer to get along” (Bhabha, 2003, p.163). 
But this apparent means of sociality can store up tensions. If in my deferral to the pluralist 
norms of a country I act out of desperation, if I “defer to your authority, your experience, 
without assenting to it, so also do you, ‘with all due respect,’ clear the ground, and your 
throat, for a conflictual or contentious engagement of terms that may disrupt the more 
consensual conversations of mankind.” But with the Iraqis there was no tension in our 
deference. We were treated as equals in a community beyond the small borders of nations, 
we were able to express ourselves fully, to talk, to disagree, and discuss and to share in 
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each other’s lives. This changed my idea of home. We were not at home, but in Iraq we 
felt “at home.”  
In a sense through all these travels and displacements from one place to the next 
we became nomads. It was not that we went out and wandered in the desert, but our 
relationship to space changed. We were deterritorialised. We were, that is, ejected from the 
order of nations, borders, territories and all the rights that derive from identity with them. 
But we were not spaceless. The words of the philosophers Deleuze and Guattari put this 
puzzle well: “the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2017, p.421). Losing our rights to officially demarcated land in one way we reterritorialised 
ourselves within the smooth, unmarked spaces of the landscape. “The nomads are there, on 
the land, wherever there forlovedms a smooth space that gnaws, and tends to grow, in all 
directions.” We were officially territory-less—but we found ways to inhabit spaces 
nonetheless, occupying whatever marginal space we found ourselves in, in between the 
territories of others. And we made our lives there. “The nomads inhabit these places; they 
remain in them, and they themselves make them grow, for it has been established that the 
nomads make the desert no less than they are made by it” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2017, 
p.421).  
There are two kinds of nomads, and I felt like both of them at different times. I saw 
myself as both Noyes (2004) nomad, who wanders free as he describes a person with choice 
and freedom. In other words, the super-rich nomad, the nomad who is free to go anywhere 
they please, at any time, to do anything. Everything is open and available to them, there 
are no barriers, no restraints, no objections. All they need to do is follow the pathways of 
their desires. On the other hand, Sutherland’s (2014) nomad does not travel out of desire; 
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it represents the refugee who travels out of necessity: having nowhere to go they must 
always be on the go. My nomadic existence felt as if it was located somewhere between 
these two extremes, moving now closer to one, now to the other, always in a state of 
becoming. When I say that I am close to Noyes nomad, I refer to the days I have spent in 
the UK, where I can move and travel freely, at least in Europe. Since I have legal residence 
in the UK, the process of travelling is stress-free. The second kind was obviously 
experienced when we were forced to leave Kuwait and then Iraq. It was not out of desire 
at all, and even before that, my father left to Kuwait in 1960 to find a job to feed his family, 
his parents and his brothers and sisters, who depended on him for their living.  
If the state of the nomad were to have a shape it would be the shape of the rhizome, 
the root which is defined not by its stable position in the ground tying it down but instead 
by its linear proliferation in all directions simultaneously. It is this infinite complexity of 
extensiveness that saves the rhizome from the experience of trauma. When the principal 
root “has aborted, or its tip”, it could be the tip of identity, of belonging, of fixed 
citizenship, “has been destroyed, an immediate, indefinite multiplicity of secondary roots 
grafts onto it and undergoes a flourishing development.” I don’t know if we were 
flourishing, but we were proliferating. Our movements were like rhizomes, in response to 
being cut off we developed other connections, we went underground, we spread out in 
every direction, we found new ways to connect.  
On August 16, 1996, we decided to return to the Gaza Strip. My brothers and sisters 
and I could not believe that we were able to return to our home town. It was something 
impossible for us to imagine. However, we applied for permission from the Israeli 
authorities to visit Gaza for 30 days and were granted it. Our movements had become 
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subject to a higher power and we were intensely aware of this form of state control, directly 
experiencing how harsh discipline can act through the “soft” measures of bureaucracy. We 
were nomads at the mercy of geopolitical conditions, with little sense of personal liberty.  
I was so naïve in thinking that the first thing I could do would be to go to Jerusalem. 
Due to the fact that we were born in Kuwait, we did not have any memories in Gaza, but 
we were eager to visit Gaza and see the people there. We did not even contact our relatives 
when we were in Kuwait and Iraq. However, we were so excited to see and visit every 
single metre in Gaza. We have always had that feeling of being proud to be Palestinian and 
we have raised many questions about Palestine when we were children. We always wanted 
to see those people who are fighting and resisting with stones. The respect and appreciation 
we saw in the eyes of non-Palestinian urged us to know more about our homeland, the land 
that we have never seen. I, myself, was 19 at that time, so I was really eager to meet those 
people. When we were children, we used to imagine Palestinian people as knights and 
heroes who cannot be beaten. Partially, it might have been due to the international day of 
solidarity with the Palestinian people when Kuwait celebrates this day on the 29th of 
November. Everything turns to the Palestinian flag that day. Our friends wanted to know 
more about Palestine and the Palestinian cause. We used to feel very proud when we started 
to tell them about Palestine. It could also be because of both family and identity again. I 
became 19 and I do not know what the word “uncle” means. I have never met an uncle, an 
aunt, a grandfather, grandmother or cousins. These words were vague for us. We were 
confused when a friend said that he or she went to visit his or her uncle. This could be 
strange for many people but for me, it was one of the reasons that motivated me to see 
Palestine. As for my father, he used to say that we cannot live anymore as guests in other 
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countries. We need to live in our country where nobody could ask you for a guarantor and 
where you can own your own property. We needed to live in Palestine, where we would 
not feel different or isolated. 
We left our home in Iraq despite knowing that we would not be able to return, nor 
that we could stay in Gaza, nor that it would be possible ever to return to Kuwait. We all 
have that feeling of uncertainty. Often this uncertainty is prolonged by waiting for papers 
and articles to arrive, to be approved, to come through. Many people know this 
prolongation of uncertainty by waiting. In the Palestinian refugee camps people wait 
without end. In detention centres asylum seekers wait almost indefinitely. People on trial 
wait interminably for their cases to be heard. It is difficult to wait. Your life is no longer 
your bare life, the life of your flesh and blood, it exists out of your hands in the form of a 
few pieces of official paper, waiting somewhere for approval so that you can move on. But 
the wait continues. 
The time waiting is spent as a time desperate for recognition. This is surely part of 
what it means to be a minority: to not be fully recognised, to be marginalised, to be on the 
periphery, eclipsed by the majority. It is the greatest frustration to exist in this in-between 
state and it has followed me around wherever I have journeyed. In all my experiences I 
continue to run up against the fact that no matter how “multicultural” societies claim to be, 
no matter how inclusive, respectful, or embracing their rhetoric, they cannot help but 
ultimately remain closed to outsiders. I mean ultimately closed, fundamentally and 
essentially closed, despite all appearances and assurances. Why is this the case? Why are 
communities so inflexibly sealed against the other? It is surely, to follow Homi Bhabha’s 
(2003) critique of Charles Taylor’s idea of “multiculturalism,” that “whole societies, 
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however universal their aspirations, are fundamentally imagined to be national or societal 
cultures in which it is impossible for the migrant or minoritarian culture “to conceive of 
their options outside of the national, even nationalist frame.” So while I waited for 
recognition desperately I also pondered whether recognition could ever in fact arrive. 
Could I ever be recognised fully when I am displaced?  
If I wanted an answer to that question a vigorous one would come from someone 
who knew well what it was both to be accepted and rejected by another culture: Frantz 
Fanon (1925-1961) In search of answers to how and why cultures recognise, or do not 
recognise others, I found Homi Bhabha again rehearsing what Fanon said: “For the culture 
of authenticity sponsored by the colonial State produces archaic, inert institutions . . . 
patterned like a caricature of formerly fertile institutions . . . a cultural mummification that 
leads to a mummification of individual thinking” (Bhabha, 2003, p.177). 
Eventually, during a time when these questions were filling my mind, the papers 
come back and the period of waiting is over. When this happened to me I had the feeling 
of insecurity mixed with being excited to see my homeland for the first time. I was thinking 
of my life and how a decision could change everything, a decision which was also far 
outside of my control, which demonstrated the working of a far-off, ultimately powerful 
state system which had my life in thrall. We had spent years in Kuwait dreaming and 
building our future and in a second we needed to start again from zero in Iraq where we 
believed that we would be able to start again. When we established strong relations with 
people in Iraq and started to see new beginning, the decision to return to Gaza was made. 
In Gaza, a new beginning had to be made. I do not know how many years are left in my 
life to have such a number of beginnings.  
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It was strange feeling to live in your country while you know that you are breaching 
the Israeli law by staying for more than 30 days. It also felt perverse to be in one country 
but still subject to the laws of another, as if you had become suspended in a zone of 
uncertainty about your own legal status. Palestine was so real: it was the location of my 
origin, the place to which I had been taught to look towards as the source of all my identity 
and the identities of my family and friends, nothing could be more real, embodied in the 
streets and buildings and ground of the place. And yet, it was also unreal. Whilst I was 
there, in the place of my origin, I was also entirely at the mercy of an absolute Israeli power. 
I had returned home to find the comforting and familiar, everything looked and felt just as 
I had in my imagination but actually, nothing was really the same, nothing would be the 
same ever again. Everywhere we are watched, and our movement is limited and controlled. 
Everywhere we go we face checkpoints. Our IDs are asked for. We are looked on with 
suspicion. We are subject to the gaze of armed police, and reminded at every turn here, in 
your home, the place where we are supposed to feel safe, literally anything can happen to 
you. For now, the armed police and border guards tolerate your presence, they deal with 
you briskly but neutrally, but you know that the peace is only kept at their discretion and 
that at any moment they might, if they choose, exert an unlimited power over you. This is 
not home; this is a camp.  
As the philosopher Giorgio Agamben (2008) describes it, the camp “is the space 
that opens up when the State of Exception starts to become the rule. In it, the State of 
Exception, which was essentially a temporal suspension of the state of law, acquires a 
permanent spatial arrangement that, as such, remains constantly outside the normal state of 
law.” With the law suspended, the inside of the camp turns into what Agamben (2016) calls 
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a “zone of indistinction” where, because of the lack of juridical protection, literally 
“everything had truly become possible” (since there was no law to forbid it). With no law 
there are no rights and no crime. Whether atrocities are actually committed in such spaces, 
or if they are, how atrocious they appear, is, for Agamben, beside the point. The ethical 
disposition of the police, or whoever it is who wields power in the camp, may restrain them 
from atrocity, but the fact remains that there is no juridical or political restraint. As 
shocking as it still appears, it was for these reasons that Agamben saw an absolute 
continuation between the concentration camps of Nazi Germany and the stadiums used for 
containing refugees across contemporary Europe. In both, life is reduced to its bare state, 
and anything can happen. And that is where we found ourselves, in a situation where the 
exception was becoming the rule, where time was bleeding into space and something we 
thought would last for a short while was stratifying into spatial boundaries that we could 
not escape. It is to this situation that Agamben gave the term “catastrophe” (Agamben, 
2010, p.57). Here the State of Exception no longer means a temporary state, a different 
space, a measure from which the state of affairs will soon draw back and return to juridical 
normality, or when the “outside” will return back into the “inside.” The State of Exception 
is instead a prolonged emergency without end, “a zone of absolute indeterminacy between 
anomie and law in which the sphere of creatures and the juridical order are caught up in a 
single catastrophe” (Agamben, 2010, p.57). 
But what other options did we have? Almost none. As a kind of a collective 
punishment, just because of being Palestinian and because we decided to return and stay in 
our land, we were not issued IDs and accordingly could not get passports. We were more 
than 50,000 Palestinian and we were living there with no identity. We could not travel 
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anywhere and many of us died because of not being able to travel even to the other part of 
Palestine to be medicated. We were caged and confined mercilessly. We could not even 
determine our future.  We were closer to detainees. I did not have permission to cross lines 
imposed by the Israeli authorities.  
Instead of being bounding limits surrounding spaces of freedom, borders became 
space itself. Everything was a border. Space itself was a continuously inhabited border 
condition through which you could not pass. After every border there were other borders, 
as if space had become an infinite succession of boundaries through which, try as we might, 
we could not pass to freedom. Those lines, borders, were even in my mind, as if the camp 
had become an interior landscape, a stratification, striation, channelling, marking, 
demarcation of my own thoughts, and whenever I saw an announcement about a 
scholarship to study abroad or a holiday, I felt extremely hopeless. Now, the 50,000 
become more than 100,000 according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(PCBS), and only very few of them were able to obtain IDs through the acts of an 
unpredictable Israeli legal system.  
One of my close friends could not travel to Slovakia although he was granted a 
scholarship from the faculty of medicine because he did not have ID. Although he is the 
head of the dermatology department in one of the hospitals in Gaza, he could not forget the 
moment when he told the university that he could not travel because of having no ID. I 
remember when he wrote to me telling me how sad he was. There are many stories about 
people who could not travel to be treated or work spread all over Gaza. Some of them 
appealed to President Arafat and President Abbas but in vain. It is all about the mode of 
the Israeli government. Indeed, even if an ID was obtained, it still did not guarantee that a 
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Palestinian could travel or move freely as they remained subject to out of the ordinary 
Israeli laws. These laws, which can be classified as emergency laws, created a Palestinian 
State of Exception. The laws of ordinary life had been suspended, rights and privileges had 
evaporated. Anything could be done to you without punishment. Agmaben (2010) 
“suspension” of legal norms in which “anything is possible” is here; we are Agamben’s 
subjects, stripped to a condition of bare life, subject to harm and punishment from a 
controlling state which operates without impunity.  
I, myself, started considering this flimsy green plastic piece constituting my 
passport as equivalent to hope and future. It was the thing that could determine my future. 
My hopes were strongly linked with this plastic piece. As frail as it was, it still symbolised 
for me a condition in which I might be protected by law, where law might still exist, where 
it might be the source of a justice that could still be believed in. Wherever that passport 
existed, whenever it was attached to my person, I could not (I thought) be reduced to “bare 
life.” I could not be suspended in a zone of indistinction, a State of Exception. Not 
everything could happen to me. The existence of the state and of law is so dispersed and 
abstract but holding my passport in my hand I felt, however vainly or naively, that I 
belonged. It was hard to believe that this rectangle thing represents freedom for tens of 
thousands of people. I knew that, and I was upset that my freedom is connected with 
something that neither I nor my country could do anything about. When the Hamas 
government won the election in 2007, I believed that I would never get an ID because there 
was no contact between Hamas, as a resistance movement, and the Israeli government.  
The whole issue was about law, how it operates to protect the rights of some, and 
suspend the rights of others. I missed many opportunities to travel and work because of my 
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lacking an ID. I was struggling to prove that I was a Palestinian living in Palestine. It was 
a really bitter feeling. Some of those who came by means of permission having been 
granted from the Israeli authorities could not even marry because many families preferred 
not to marry their daughters to someone who has no ID. This is of course regardless of the 
fact that the people who had no ID were well known among the society; most of them came 
from reputed families and a great percentage of them are doctors, engineers, scholars and 
teachers.  
It was a kind of pressurising the Palestinian people and a practice which put such 
psychological pressure upon us as though someone were telling you that you do not fully 
exist by yourself and that your mere presence is not enough to represent you, instead, you 
need this paper document to represent you and testify who you are. We came to Gaza Strip 
in 1996, and I needed to have a bank account after graduation when I had my first job in 
2003. You can represent yourself physically, but again you need this piece of paper to be 
recognised. One day I needed to open a bank account to receive my salary from the Spanish 
organisation with which I was working as a coordinator. Since the HQ of the organisation 
was in Jerusalem, there was a need to transfer the money. I went to the bank to open an 
account, the employee there asked me for my ID. I gave him my travel document, which 
was normally used as a proof of identity. Surprisingly, he said, “Sorry Mr. Muayyad. I 
cannot process your application”. I told him that I am Palestinian and I live in Gaza; I 
needed an account. It was in the interest of both the bank and myself. However, he 
apologised saying that these were the orders of the administration and he could do nothing. 
I wanted to look in the mirror at that moment to see if I was transparent. I did not realise 
until that moment that things are so complicated that you cannot do your daily tasks. The 
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same thing happened several times whenever I wanted to have governmental documents. I 
started believing that I was a symbol of emptiness and worthlessness. 
If violence is simply understood as physical brutality then I did not suffer direct 
violence from the Israeli state in Palestine. But violence fractures and splinters through so 
many more kinds of human experience, not all of them with visible physical signs. It is 
again Homi Bhabha (2015) reading Frantz Fanon who has to me most poignantly 
explicated the nature of violence. Violence is physical, but it is also aggression, hostility, 
cruelty, alienation, psychic manipulation, and a violation of others’ rights. If violence is 
conceived like this, and if it is understood to be constitutive of the postcolonial 
environment, then I suffered violence at the hands of the Israeli state. If the violence was 
not physical it was symbolic, at every possible opportunity I was humiliated by the 
bureaucracy and laws which Israel had put in place to restrain me, and many others like 
me. I had not given my assent to Israel, and since any state which does not manufacture 
the consent of its citizens proceeds to coerce them by force into doing what it wants them 
to do, I became subject to coercion. I could have thought that this violence represented a 
power over me, but through reading Hannah Arendt (1969) I came to understand that in 
fact violence was the absence of power. As she says, “violence appears where power is in 
jeopardy.” Power, at least political power, is in dialogue, in consensus, in shared decision 
making which empowers the people and, through them, the state which represents them. 
But as Grinberg (2011) explains, “violence is a unilateral imposition. Violence can destroy 
political power, but cannot build it.” At the same time violence cannot be thought outside 
of those who perpetrate it, and this is how Grinberg really changes everything because he 
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perceives Israel to be the embodiment of violence. That is how I experienced it. Israel was 
a re-presentation of violence, not just in one respect but in many.  
  This kind of violence leaves no immediate physical trace. It is not spectacular like 
beating or a gunshot – often it is not even visible at all. But this is worse: no one even sees 
the violence. Invisible violence: its weapons are the documents, the identity card, the 
regulation, the waiting list, the bank clerk, surveillance systems. It is done in the name of 
law and order. Israel had become a specialist at this. It had internalised the militarism of 
the police into the operations of the state bureaucracy, and many people suffered. 
Everything was surveilled. Israel had become a surveillance machine. As Zureik, Lyon, 
and Abu Laban (2013) have written, surveillance has emerged in Israel out of a legacy of 
colonialism which rendered the native land to its Orientalist gaze in order to control it. If 
it could be seen, watched, measured, it could be controlled. After the withdrawal of the 
colonial state, a replacement came in the form of Israel. It was a different system, but the 
violence of it was systemic. This means that whenever I was able to read, or to think about 
reading, or to write, even to write like this, I was able, in some small but for me highly 
significant way, to escape from surveillance. It was like I was writing my own passport.  
In 2012, I was able to get my ID when 2000 names were announced to be granted 
IDs. Some of the applicants do not even remember whether they applied or not. It was just 
that Israel decided to grant one of their rights and this was granted to a limited group of 
people among thousands more who were denied that which for millions of people 
elsewhere is a basic right. For the outside world, it was a gesture of generosity and 
kindness. Yet, for Palestinians, we knew it is another sign of treating us like slaves. Your 
own rights are determined by Israel; this includes your national ID. To make that so clear, 
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this right was granted for exclusive persons whom were chosen by the Israeli authorities. 
This act showed the world that Israel was following law by considering the humanitarian 
needs of people in Palestine; however, it confirms the power and authority of Israel at the 
same time. This was the perverseness of the situation in which I found myself forced to be 
glad about the arbitrary operation of a foreign state power in my life. I struggled to 
comprehend the nature of their gesture. Their treatment of us always felt illegal, the 
opposite of law. This is the paradox of the situation. Laws are supposed to protect you and 
to be above any one single agent. But here laws were constantly hedging us in and limiting 
the very freedoms they are supposed to protect. I felt like the subject of illegal laws.  
The waiting without end in sight, followed by a sudden and unexpected change, 
indicates something about a significant element in our lives: time. To take the example of 
the refugee camps: time is not working there, it is suspended. It is not subject to the ordinary 
changes and possibilities of everyday life, but goes on in a kind of vacuum, cut off from 
the time of life outside both eventless and yet subject to sudden and unpredictable ruptures. 
This is exactly what is happening to the Palestinian people. We cannot plan for even one 
day. Everything is unpredictable. Whenever I have a look at the calendar, I always know 
what this means. In Palestine, it is impossible to say, “I will do this and I am planning for 
that next week”. This is impossible in Palestine. Because of suspended rights, even going 
to an event in Gaza or simply visiting a friend is not guaranteed. It is as simple as that. I 
vividly remember when I got a visa to the UK, which is very complicated process for 
Palestinians. However, I still needed to apply for a permission from Israel and another one 
from Jordan. I was rejected three times before being approved and for several months I was 
neither rejected nor approved. It was being processed for 6 months. They never tell you 
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that you are rejected; you just keep waiting and after a few weeks, you know that you need 
to renew your application. I was counting days and even hours and time was very slow. At 
certain moment my family and friends told me to forget everything about that issue. Samuel 
Beckett’s “Waiting for Goddot”(2010) was in the back of my mind all the time. It was one 
of the first plays I read when I started my first degree in 1998. I do not know why this 
particular part is always in my mind: 
 “Let’s go.”  
“We can’t.” 
 “Why not?” 
 “We’re waiting for Godot” (quoted in Graver, 2004, p.34). 
It might be because of the conception of suspension and waiting in which we have 
been living for years. It could be because of the fact that in 1998, I was unable to travel or 
move and I did not know when I was going to be granted an ID. I still remember the 
question of one of the best professors I have ever met when he used to ask me about my 
plans and why I did not travel. I used to answer: “I cannot; I am waiting my ID.” In other 
words, even having this paper which apparently represents you does not guarantee that you 
will pass or travel. Another clearer example of that I was then called by the Israeli 
authorities and told to leave the next morning. A mixture of feelings overwhelmed me. 
That night, some rockets hit, and there was some firing and shooting. Again, everything 
was suspended and I could not travel the next morning so awaited another call which might 
ask me to leave. I was called and asked to leave the next day. I had few hours to say 
goodbye to many people. A very limited time to arrange for a 3-year journey.  
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We knew that such thing would happen, but when it happened suddenly and after 
6 months when we had started to feel despair; it was as if I was waiting to be shot. We went 
quickly to my father to tell him that we were travelling the next morning. I wanted to stay 
longer with him, yet I had to be quick as so many arrangements had to be made and so 
many things to be done. I had that feeling that I might not see him again, but I had to hurry 
in order not to miss that chance. We went to my wife’s aunts and uncles, then we went to 
my brothers and sisters after midnight. We were trying to prioritise things and go to people 
who lived close to each other but we could not see everyone. We did not sleep that night 
and we called those whom we could not go to visit.  
The whole issue was more complicated that having an ID or a passport to travel and 
carry out daily life activities, the struggle to attain a passport is nothing less than the 
struggle to attain civil existence. For us, the background to that struggle was one of 
nomadism, of wandering between places, deterritorialised from home. In this nomadic 
world, with my photo and biometric data imprinted in it, the passport represents my power 
to exist, to be recognised, to have status, to enjoy rights, to be allowed free passage. It is 








I did not think that holding a book would cause all these feelings; I did not think 
that holding some old papers or a photo of someone’s handwriting would evoke such 
feelings. However, this happens whenever I start reading this book and those papers. They 
are related to the worst day in my whole life. The day when my father passed away while 
I was doing my best to make him proud of me; the day when I felt that I am still a child 
although I am 42. I read, heard and watched a lot about knowing the value of things when 
missing it, but I have never thought of this until my father died. This book is a collection 
of poems that my father wrote during the last 30 years; some of them are even older. As a 
professor of Arabic, my father was fascinated with language and spent days and nights 
writing poetry. A few months before travelling to the UK, I decided to publish all the poems 
he wrote. I started collecting all the papers he wrote. Some of them were yellow and almost 
torn. The smell of cigarette wafted out whenever I start reading those pages. I collected 
everything he wrote and started typing and editing that. His handwriting was really unique 
and I felt honesty and sincerity in every single line he wrote. His feelings about the subject 
matters he wrote about were smoothly conveyed to me and this is how I believe it to be 
realistic and honest.  
As I recall the passing of my father I also recall one of his most poignant poems, 
which was composed on the death of my mother. An Elegy to My Um Mu’tasim summed 
up the lifelong devotion of my father for my mother after her death from diabetes. The two 
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of them had met when they were both still young and shared their lives together—the sense 
of the passing of time is one of the most arresting aspects of the poem with its transition 
from youth to age. It was characteristic of my father to be able to move between the 
particularities of our earthly existence—holding hands, caring in sickness and health, 
walking in the garden—to the eternal aspects of the divine and the hope of meeting again 
the loved ones who have departed. It was a difficult time for my father, to endure the 
sickness my mother suffered, through which she became weaker and more confined, but 
he accepted his role as care-giver and never lost his adoration for his soul mate. For me, as 
I read it, considering my father’s legacy I can see that in some way what I am writing now 
is also an elegy—a short story, not a poem, but that is my way. This is one of the reasons 
we write—about people, about places—because we are distant from them. Even though 
they are inaccessible we still somehow believe that language has relevance. 
The evocation of an absent presence in photographs and texts is strong. The pages 
(see p.100 and the accompanying video) were held in his hands, the light in them once 
reflected from his own body. Those things were really there. When I see them I experience 
what Barthes described as the “punctum”, the puncturing moment when you suddenly 
become aware of this presence (Barthes, 2012). Barthes began his reflection on 
photography in the wake of the death of his mother. For him, photography is bound up with 
death. This has helped me think through these images of my father. The essence or specific 
character of photography is what Barthes called a “that-has-been”, “a certificate of the 
presence of something that is past”. A photograph weaves together presence and absence, 
present and past. The nature of the medium as an indexical imprint of the object means that 
any photographed object or person has a ghostly, uncanny presence that might be likened 
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to the return of the dead” (Iversen, 2007, p.114). I have that photograph with me as I write 
this, finding the image and my writing to be inseparable records of a “that-has-been.”  
I spent more than 6 months doing this job and every time I finished and printed 
several pages, I used to go to him and he starts reading and making some comments about 
this word and that line, which should be intended and this space that should be bigger. I 
tried many times to convince him that the layout of the pages is the last stage but I still 
remember that he kept asking for changes whenever he found something wrong.  
The book was 220 pages, which is coincidently the same number of my house here 
in the UK, but I can confirm that we printed more than 2000 pages so that he could review 
everything. He did not feel comfortable when he was reading the pages on the computer; 
that is why I needed to print the pages and mark the changes and then modify them and 
print them again to show him.  
Usually, I finished work at 15:00 and straight after work, I used to go to him and 
spend a few hours there so that I could finish and print the book before travelling. 
Travelling itself was pressurising me as nothing was guaranteed, and I could be asked to 
leave at any moment. I used to work harder on Fridays and Saturdays because I know that 
the Israeli authorities do not call those days. I kept going to the publisher and the designer 
so that work could be done on time. I remember that I handed him the first copy two days 
before travelling. I brought him my copy and asked him to sign it a few hours before 
travelling. 
 My father was an academic, and he published many papers as a professor of Arabic 
grammar and eloquence. He worked at the University of Kuwait, University of Saddam, 
Islamic University and Aqsa University. Although we were enjoying life in Kuwait, the 
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feeling of homesickness was overwhelming him, and we could see this in his words and 
gestures. We were surprised, as we were still young at that time, that someone could leave 
Kuwait, where he had a good position to leave to the unknown. However, one of the things 
that characterised him was his ability to foresee the future. In many cases, we were looking 
at each other when he used to say something and we thought that he was pessimistic or that 
he exaggerated. Yet, after some years, we could realise that most of the things he talked 
about had already happened. This includes being forced to leave Kuwait. Of course, he did 
not expect that Saddam Hussein would invade Kuwait but he used to say that we would 
leave Kuwait soon. It might be his experience in the countries where he spent his life 
working with people from different nationalities, and of course it was his intelligence. I am 
not saying that because he is my father, but the stories I was told by his friends confirmed 
this belief.  
I was surprised that he did not often narrate these situations to us, but as I mentioned 
earlier, being silent most of the time was the main thing that characterised my father. His 
main trait was patience; he was very patient to the extent that sometimes we thought that 
he did not care. I remember a situation that was told by one of his colleagues when he was 
appointed as an educational supervisor in Kuwait when he was the youngest among all the 
other staff. One of his Egyptian colleagues did not like the idea of being supervised by a 
young Palestinian man, and he kept trying to embarrass him. One day, my father was 
talking about a certain topic and that person tried to have an argument with my father, who 
was very quiet. Suddenly, the other teacher struck the table and pushed the notebooks that 
my father was correcting. All the notebooks were on the floor and surprisingly to all the 
staff my father did not say anything. He just stood and bowed to collect the notebooks. I 
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could not believe that anyone, in our eastern society, could do a similar thing. After a few 
weeks, that teacher apologised to my father and said that he tried to prove that my father 
was not qualified to supervise a group of older teachers but he realised that he deserved 
that position. What is really remarkable is that the teacher became a close friend of my 
father and visited us several times. One day, he wanted to tell us about how he first met my 
father; we pretended not to know the story so that we could hear it from the teacher himself.  
 While writing about him, I cannot stop thinking about the conception of 
displacement that he used to talk about. He used to remind us that we were not living in 
our country, and we might be forced to leave at any moment. He always highlighted the 
fact that we are directly and indirectly affected by the political situation around us. The 
idea of uncertainty was always there when he talked to us. It was only gradually that I 
began to understand how his sense of uncertainty was always related to space, the 
uncertainty of a kind of space which is ambiguous, a borderline, a fringe, an intersection, 
neither fully here nor fully there. When I say “space” I mean literally a location, but I also 
mean that all spaces are always political, philosophical conditions too. Agamben speaks 
about “points of imbalance between public law and political fact” (he is quoting Saint-
Bonnet), or “ambiguous, uncertain, borderline, fringe[s] at the intersection of the legal and 
the political” (this time quoting Fontana) (Agamben, 2005, 1). It was through my father 
that I began to grasp the complexity of the thing we refer to when we talk about occupying 
a space with uncertainty. It is perhaps only by experiencing uncertainty that we come to 
realise that space itself cannot be taken for granted, that it is never fixed, stable, or secure 
for anything more than a moment. I suppose it was my natural reverence of my father, his 
appearing both always somewhat distant, yet also so near and loving, that made me think 
70 
of him as a kind of sovereign. It is difficult to explain this reverence. I saw my father both 
in the light of the world and also as being outside the world. Again, I found, much later, in 
the work of Agamben a kind of language that was able to articulate this paradox in which 
my father appeared to me. “Being-outside, and yet belonging,” Agamben writes, “this is 
the topological structure of the State of Exception, and only because the sovereign, who 
decides on the exception, is, in truth, logically defined in his being by the exception, can 
he too be defined by the oxymoron ecstasy-belonging” (Agamben, 2015, p.35). I am not 
the only one who has noticed Agamben’s fascination with the “topological” uncertainty of 
belonging (Murray & Whyte, 2011, Pp.65-6). But I feel that my father lived this 
uncertainty—like the sovereign Agamben described—he both belonged to the world I was 
(and am still) a part of but was also outside of it. This is the meaning of ec-stasy.   
One of the things that I learnt from him is not guaranteeing what I already have and 
work hard to secure other alternatives. I found it strange when I was young to absorb this 
idea. We were living in Kuwait with a good job and the situation in Kuwait was really 
stable. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, people were affected in different ways. 
However, the people who have been suffering until this moment are the Palestinians. Some 
countries benefited from what had happened such as Syria and Egypt. Others were 
temporarily affected such as Yemen and Jordan. Palestinians were the only people who 
have been suffering until this moment.   
My father’s position, his position in time and space, his metaphysical, philosophical 
position, was decentred. He did not inhabit a centre. He, and all of us with him, were living 
away from our centre. The centre was always, I began to realise, present to him, but only 
in the form of an absence. The centre was elsewhere, it was where we were not, it was 
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somewhere to which we might one day return but on whose periphery we were forced to 
live for now. It is perhaps for this reason that I have come to understand a certain sympathy 
between my father’s character and disposition as I remember him and the lives and work 
of those philosophers who have written most poignantly about “decentring” from the 
position of their own exile or displacement. Jacques Derrida is just such a philosopher, a 
French-Algerian, a man who experienced life at the periphery, and the uncertainties that 
develop there. It was Derrida, for me, who conceived most poignantly of “a subject not 
anchored to structure, to formal ‘presence,’ but one that occurs in the in-between spaces 
(between subject and object in the representational corridors of a dismantled and 
defamiliarised grammar” (Brott, 2016, p.49).  
Whenever I want to feel my father now, I just start reading the papers written by 
him, not the book. I do read some poems from the book especially the ones about my 
mother but the feeling I have when reading his handwriting is different. I can still smell 
him and feel him. I can remember all the moments of commenting, arguing, discussing, 
reading, listening, standing, eating and drinking as we did all these things during the 
process of editing the poems. He used to sit and read while I was standing behind him 
waiting his comments. He was a heavy smoker who had never puffed his cigarette. He just 
put it in his mouth and when finished he replaced it by another and another. I remember 
how my eyes were burning because of the smoke, yet I could not say anything. It was not 
just that in my culture, I cannot ask my father to stop smoking even if this harms me. This 
is completely different in the UK and in the West in general, but for me, I was happy doing 
that and I have never regretted doing similar things. It was something inside me and it was 
asking me not to ask him to stop doing something he likes. When I left and as soon as I 
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arrived home, my wife asked her typical question: “Have you started smoking?” I just 
smiled and said, “I did not and I would never”. It was the only thing that I did not want to 
imitate my father in.  
I was in France that day, and I decided to check my Facebook although I do not do 
that very often when I am on holiday. I was stunned when I found a post in which the 
university was lamenting my father’s passing. It is impossible to describe that moment. I 
will never forget that morning. The children were asleep and my wife was preparing stuff 
to start our day. I said to myself that there must have been a kind of misunderstanding. My 
father cannot die before seeing me with my doctoral degree. I promised him that I would 
be back as soon as I could, and this was the main thing that urged me to finish as quick as 
I could. I still remember the last night when we went to him to say goodbye and to sign the 
book. I believed that the time I spent with him was not enough so I went again the next 
morning, and he asked me to leave so that I could travel. I remember when I kept calling 
him whenever I passed crossing point in Gaza, Jordan and when I arrived to the UK. 
Although I have a bad memory, I can still remember every single word he said and every 
piece of advice he had given. I tried to be strong, and I did not want the children to feel that 
I was sad. I did not cry at that moment and I knew that I would burst at any time, but I did 
not want that to be when sitting with the children. We went to the swimming pool that 
morning and I was sitting there while they were playing and swimming. Suddenly, all my 
feelings turned to tears. I cried and cried and cried. I covered my face with newspaper so 
that nobody could see me. For more than an hour, I was doing nothing but remembering 
him and crying. I did not know how much I love him until that moment. I thought I knew 
but I did not.   
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It was also at that moment that perhaps the first time in my life I experienced what 
Heidegger called “the being-towards-death” the authentic realisation that death itself is 
constitutive of all of our being, in fact that death is the thing about us which is most 
authentic. Sitting by the pool, burying my head in the newspaper, crying, a felt my own 
being thrown towards death and felt poignantly and painfully my own father’s being 
thrown towards death too, and the feeling that we are all disposed to living out an encounter 
with what Heidegger calls “das Nichts”, nothingness (Malpas & Solomon, 2005, p.89). 
Nothingness, I thought at that moment, nothingness is what being is.  
What hurts me even more and made things worse was being unable to attend the 
funeral of my father. I was willing to sacrifice anything to have a final look at him.  To 
travel back to Palestine, I needed to apply for a permission from Jordan and another one 
from the Israeli authorities, and this could last forever. Even if you get the required 
permissions, the possibility of not being able to return to the UK is very great. In Palestine, 
a funeral happens within three days and three days are not enough for processing my 
application. I will keep asking myself why a person cannot attend the funeral of his or her 
father. I cannot understand how Israelis could speak about human rights when people are 
denied this basic rights.  
It is at moments of crisis like this that you realise what the really important basic 
structures of life are, or at least this is what it was like for me. In the midst of everything 
else that was happening in life suddenly death intervenes, and you have no greater, more 
simple, and more basic wish than to be with your beloved before they depart the world. Is 
there anyone who would not sympathise with such a wish? Is there anyone who would 
deny you the right to complete this act? Though I had committed no crimes I was indeed 
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denied this right—not explicitly, not outright, but in the lugubrious bureaucracy of the 
militarised state. In Roman law it was the norm to openly declare an enemy of state as 
“hostis”—a public enemy, a figure “radically deprived of any legal status and [who] could 
therefore be stripped of his belongings and put to death at any moment” (Agamben, 2005, 
p.80). My prohibition from visiting my father one last time felt, to me, as if I were being 
declared “hostis”, a public enemy, radically deprived of my rights and the anger, and 
humiliation, and bitterness of this judgment upon me is something I must continually take 
with me.  
I wanted to see my father and kiss his face and hands. I wanted to apologise for not 
spending much time with him. I wanted to tell him that I would soon get my degree and 
make him proud of me. I wanted to ask him about many issues to which his answers would 
be really helpful. However, I could not even see him. Why? Because I am Palestinian and 
I do not have the right to return to my home country. I do not have the right to move freely; 
I do not have the right to say goodbye to persons whom I love. Telling my children about 
the reason why we could not see their grandfather is also unexplainable. If I want to tell 
my children the real reason, I might harm the security and safety of the state of Israel. My 
children could be considered as potential terrorists in the future. At the point in my life at 
which I needed the security and rights of a citizen most, at a point when I needed a 
beneficent state to support the welfare of myself and my family, I was denied them. It will 
not come as a surprise to anyone who has become familiar with the political thought of 
Hannah Arendt that the state so often fails at the moment when it is most needed to protect 
the basic rights it supposedly exists to protect. “The conception of human rights,” she states 
(in a passage also key for Agamben in explaining his own theory of biopolitics) “based 
75 
upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment 
when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people 
who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships—except that they were 
still human” (Arendt, 1994, p.299). As Agamben reflects on this passage, “in the system 
of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man show themselves to 
lack every protection and reality at the moment in which they can no longer take the form 
of rights belonging to citizens of state” (Agamben, 2016). How much I wished for the right 
to move freely at that moment! The right to visit my home country with my children and 
to be able to return to where we were afterwards.  
My children of course were unable to understand and I was unable to explain. How 
can such a thing be explained? Its inexplicability in the eyes of children, like the 
inexplicability of death itself, is impossible to remove. I could not explain what it meant 
that their grandfather had died, nor could I explain why we were unable to go home. My 
children used to talk to their grandfather and recite things they could memorise; they could 
narrate some stories, verses of Holy Quran and rarely some short poems. When they ask 
innocently, “Why do not we call our grandfather as usual?” I have no answer. I could only 
say he died. This leads to a series of questions for most of which I have no convincing 
answers. The only definite thing is that we are being punished for living in what I can only 
conceive of as a “camp,” a “State of Exception” in which the ordinary rule of law and 
norms is suspended and anything can happen. A state where you cannot enjoy your basic 
rights and where you are reduced to live as “bare life” in a “no-man’s land between public 
law and political fact, and between juridical order and life” in a “threshold of indeterminacy 
between democracy and absolutism” (Agamben, 2005, 1 & 3).   
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Our life became a series of unpleasant surprises due to the situation of life in Gaza 
Strip. I became really concerned that a similar thing could happen to my wife as she cannot 
travel to see her family. Her parents wanted to come last summer but again they faced the 
issue of permission and closure of boarders. It is true that her parents are still young, but 
as everybody knows, you cannot anticipate death. When we first left Gaza, we were certain 
that the situation would not last forever and within few years everything would improve. 
However, things became even worse than the day we left. People receive no salaries and 
electricity is available for less than 4 hours every day. Life in Gaza is deteriorating socially 
and economically and it seems that the worst is yet to come. I found it a little strange to 
start thinking about my father and end with talking about life in Gaza. However, separating 
between personal life and life in general in Gaza is almost impossible. Even academically, 
and when one lives in the UK, where one should enjoy life without restrictions and make 
the most of the academic life, the political situation is still affecting us as Palestinians. Last 
week, one of my friends who is doing his doctoral studies in Scotland, called me and he 
was absolutely upset. He told me that as a part of his research he needs to go to West Bank 
and Gaza Strip to collect data from managers at one of the biggest Palestinian 
telecommunications companies. After coordinating for a few weeks with the managers, he 
was shocked to know that he cannot get a permission to travel to either part. His supervisor 
has been very cooperative, but the fact that he should be the one who conducts the 
interviews made things really bad. He considered other options including interviewing 
them via Skype but due to the electricity problem, this will not work. Other options include 
conducting the interviews by other persons, which is not a scientific option at all. He has 
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been suffering psychologically for the last few days due to this problem which was created 
just because he is Palestinian and cannot go to his homeland.  
“One of the essential characteristics of modern biopolitics,” writes Agamben, “is 
its constant need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is 
inside from what is outside” (Agamben, 2016, p.131). What he was experiencing, and what 
I have continued to experience, is this “constant need to redefine the threshold.” Both of 
us feel the “disquieting elements” Agamben speaks of, interruptions to the continuity of 
the state, problems at its borders, which it attempts over and over at every opportunity to 
encompass in its biopolitical regime. Death is not a release from this bipolitical power since 
biopolitics is targeted at the “bare life” the “zoe” (in Greek) which all men, animals, and 
gods possess. “bringing to light the difference between birth and nation,” Agamben 
continues, “the refugee causes the secret presupposition of the political domain—bare 
life—to appear for an instant within that domain” (Agamben, 2016, p.131). My friend’s 
predicament emblematises the presuppositions of the political domain, his struggle for free 
movement and access to communication exposed the grip which the political domain holds 
over his bare life.  
When he told me his story asking for advice, I remembered the situation in which 
I could not travel to attend the funeral of my father. Regardless of the difference between 
both situations, they resulted in huge psychological pressure which affected our study 
negatively. We began to feel that we were having our rights stripped away. Other scholars 
from different countries will never face such an issue. Their focus will always be on their 
studies. I know many scholars from different countries, and I have not heard a situation 
where a scholar could not return to his or her country because of the regulations of another 
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country. I share many things with one of them. We were awarded HESPAL scholarship for 
both Master and doctoral studies, and we have been to the UK twice. His father died just a 
few days before travelling to the UK. We were teaching at two different universities in 
Gaza.  I studied in Lincoln for my MA and he studied in Lancashire. I remember when we 
met for the first time in a meeting for HESPAL scholars in London where we shared our 
thoughts as a group of Palestinian academics. For those who live in the West Bank, things 
are a lot easier regarding travelling. For people in Gaza, it has been almost impossible for 
all the scholars to return to Gaza during their studies. It is even more difficult for the new 
scholars to leave Gaza and they suffer a lot in order to leave. I always connect this situation 
with the situation of my father who could not apply for his PhD for 10 years because of the 
political situation in Egypt. Because of this, all Palestinian were prevented from entering 
Egypt for many years. It was almost impossible to get a visa for studying in Egypt at that 
time and the degree of my father was delayed for more than 10 years. In 1990, he got his 
PhD and just 2 weeks after that, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. He did not even enjoy 
promotion or any other incentives. This was part of our suffering as Palestinians and as 
academics. The degrees my father had and his experience and certificates were in one hand 
and being Palestinian was in the other hand. This split between birth and nation could not 
be resolved fully in the eyes of the state, nor in the eyes of those within the state who 
worked alongside my father, who were still unable to grasp how such a thing might exist.  
I have not been to Gaza since his death, but I am certain that the house will not have 
that smell again. My father was like a hand that holds some sand. He was holding the sand 
tightly and when he died, the sand spread everywhere. In the east, this is the importance of 
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father. Luckily, I kept all his drafts at my flat and I sent for them, but God only knows 
when I will receive them.  
The first person who contacted me that day was one of my closest friends with 
whom I spent four years at university. Muhammad has had a tragic story. He was living in 
Saudi Arabi where he was born and he came to Gaza in 1997 to study at one of the 
universities in Gaza since he could not study in Saudi Arabia. Muhammad used to travel 
every year to renew his residency and update his status there. However, after the second 
Intifada in 2000, he could not travel due to the closure of boarders imposed at that time by 
Israel. He was in his final year and he had four modules to pass out of more than 50 
completed. Yet, his residency there was about to expire and he needed to travel to renew 
it. Boarders were not accessed easily and he knew that if he travelled he would not be able 
to return and complete the remaining modules. He needed to travel and needed to stay. It 
was the toughest decision ever. Those days were really hard and I remember he lost a lot 
of weight in just few weeks. Finally, he decided to leave and renew his residency and until 
this moment he has not been able to return to Gaza to complete the modules and at the 
same time he could not join any of the Saudi universities. He registered for a diploma and 
he started from zero to get a certificate to work. All his efforts for more than four years 
vanished because of not having any options as a Palestinian.  
Muhammad, too, was experiencing the stripping away of his rights. The more 
stripped away your rights and work and life becomes, the more bare they are, the more 
reduced to simple, bare, animal life. One could turn again to Agamben and read in his work 
the narratives of stripping away that accompany the stories of the Jews leading up to and 
including the Nuremberg laws that stripped away all but their minimum definition as 
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citizens (Agamben, 2016, p.132). The terror which we feel as academics is the terror of 
this stripping away. If it is first our access to research second it is our access to free 
movement, third it is our access to family—it is this cumulative politizicization of every 
aspect of life, however apparently neutral or private, that according to Agamben 
characterises both totalitarian societies and democratic ones (Agamben, 2016, p.121). But 
we know that there is still more to strip away, and it is the fear (which is increased by our 
knowledge of history) of the further stripping away of our lives until we are “considered to 
be nothing” that is so difficult (Agamben, 2016, p.135).  
Many lives are woven together in this story of bare life. As my wife helped in typing 
and editing the book of my father, and as she is a postgraduate student as well, my wife 
became part of the story. She used to ask my father about many issues in her study, and she 
was really interested in the things he used to highlight. We were mesmerised whenever he 
started to speak. His experience was unusual and his stories were a group of lessons. In 
each situation, we found wisdom. He was working hard to afford the needs of our house. 
My eldest sister travelled to Syria and my eldest brother travelled to the USA. It was a lot 
of money to gain and spend on a nine-member family in exile where one needs to manage 
his or her needs.  My wife had a similar situation in which she suffered a lot as she could 
not attend her sister’s wedding. I am not sure if this kind of feelings is the same for people 
in the UK, but I believe that eastern people are very sensitive and bad memories may last 
forever. My wife was planning for the wedding of her sister and she was responsible for 
all the details of the wedding. Surprisingly, just a week before the wedding our permissions 
were issued and we were asked to leave. We tried to postpone leaving for just few days so 
that she could attend the wedding, but the answer was no way. We were already late and 
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we would arrive in June while studying started in October and for us there was no harm to 
stay for few days. Yet, we were told that if we did not travel the next day, we would risk 
being banned to travel forever. She was coordinating all the details on the mobile and she 
spent the first week in the UK calling and arranging the event. Luckily, we managed to 
watch the wedding via Youtube with special complex arrangements with the English 
family we were staying with. We were sitting together and they, kindly, served juice in 
special glasses so that we felt that we were among the attendance. At that time, I could see 
tears in my wife’s eyes, and I could not tell if the tears were because of happiness or 
bitterness that she could not attend.  
Weddings in Palestine are very special occasions where preparation and celebrating 
may take a long time, and they are the most important thing for many people. It is not only 
for the bride and groom. It is also for their parents and brothers and sisters. In Palestine, 
many problems are solved because of attending a wedding and many others are created by 
not attending a wedding. The importance of weddings is significantly important in Gaza in 
particular. Regrettably, the wedding of my brother-in-law, Nourhan’s brother, is in July 
and again she will not be able to attend the wedding of her only brother. The children grew 
up and they keep asking about the wedding and what they should wear. Attending a 
wedding is something that does not need to be argued and discussed except for Palestinians. 
We should sacrifice many things to attend and this does not necessarily guarantee being 
able to attend the wedding of the ones you love.  
When we sit and talk about the most powerful experiences we had had, we talk only 
about those two situations. Paradoxically, the occasions are death and wedding. Yet, the 
effect is the same. We are prevented of practising the rights that may lighten our pain and 
82 
make us happier. We are punished for nothing and in Palestine, in Gaza in particular, 
everything is possible since it is not a state; it is a camp. Actually, the biggest camp and 
prison in the world. Leaving Gaza was really hard and behind us we left almost everything, 
but also living in a different culture makes things more obvious to you and to your family. 
Now, we are trying to enjoy every single minute in the UK because we know that soon we 
will return to the camp.  
And so in response to these exceptional states of unfreedom, these barriers, this 
experience of bare life, I am writing this story about my father and for my father. These 
thoughts are for him, meaning, in the words of Derrida speaking about the death of his 
friend Roland Barthes:  
that I think of him and about him, not only of or about his work. ‘For him’ also 
suggests that I would like to dedicate these thoughts to him, give them to him, and 
destine them for him. Yet, they will no longer reach him, and this must be the 
starting point of my reflection; they can no longer reach him, reach all the way to 




An Elegy to My Um Mu’tasim 
 
To your soul I sail my greetings,   
 On wings of love and sincerity.  
The one whose heart has but care:  
 The love of my life, my dearie. 
In Darkness and Light, she held my hand tight,  
 In richness and hardships, she took my side.  
Shared she my downfalls and showed patience,   
 And only said to me the sweetest laughter; 
Spoke only of what she deemed good,   
 And was always the kinder.  
Her face, so pure and white, when we first met  
 “Oh,” my heart bounced, “so tender”; 
And where life broke us to pieces,   
 She, so heartfully, put them back: 
Her smiles defeated all misfortune,   
 And her heart fearlessly fought! 
A young man was I and she kept me fresh  
 So when she turned grey, I kept her so as well. 
An old man I became, but she   
 Left me not so dread -  
A mother more:   
 A glamorous star – my savior.  
If sickness snitches my body,   
 her healing touch brings comfort; 
So I pray – day and night: May the Lord  
 Keep her safe. 
Our days together – O! So precious,   
 And in laughter, so joyous.  
And so were we a happy couple   
 And full of life, the two of us together. 
But how dark was the day,   
 When her eyes saw the light never after:  
Pain and tears and hushed cries  
 And her heart so sick and tumble.  
So fragile she became –   
 So helpless she felt:  
A doctor after another, with hands so clever  
 But none was able to heal her. 
She, thus, stayed in pain all night   
 And her days were not much different; 
So I swore to be her guardian  
 And the eyes she had – no longer.  
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A servant and a cane, I pledged to be both  
 And slowly I helped her  
As she moved around our garden. 
No feelings of boredom nor hate  
 Took over the heart of mine: 
She, so loved, took my hand   
 When I could not move or stand.  
How could I, then, leave her when  
 She needed me the most? 
I send my prayers every night  
 To the Creator of the worlds 
My eyes see no sleep and my mouth never stops,   
 “May she see again,” I repeat on and on.  
“May she see again,”  
 And her body so strong become.  
Slowly I kneel by the side of hers,   
 And kindly I approach her heavy bed:  
I am here where I will always be  
 Near your heart and your soul. 
My heart, so full of grief, bounces weakly for her  
 But her heart, so full of belief, bounces strongly for God. 
She is patient – and kind – and sweet  
 And stronger than I will ever be.  
Such distress would break others apart,  
 But “It’s a test”, I told her still. 
When death comes, who shall fight?  
 For those before us are all dead.  
We are all the servants of God,  
 To him we shall return –  
On a day when regret shall be of no worth  
 And only the good will win. 
I embraced our destiny and patiently observed as it 
comes 
 
 Praying that you would be healed 
Knowing not death is about to be here;   
 You – left. 
I, so alone, became, for no one else kept me 
company.  
 
 You – left.  
And I am here in sorrow as I cry our memories out. 
Yet, be sure and know,  
 










It will linger in me so long as I breathe. 
To where she goes, my prayers be, 
“O, where my Nahlah resides, 
The grave of her body, be 
Of the land’s greatest riches. 
O, the drops of rain drop 
And water her bed of flowers. 
O Lord, do forgive 
Her slips and falls 







Life in Chester 
 
It was another memorable day when we first arrived to the UK. In discussing the travelling 
of our journey and how exhausting it was, I am now talking about the most important period 
of my life. The days I spent in Chester, particularly the first few days, affected the rest of 
the years I spent here in Chester. The beginning left its impression until the end. The effect 
of these days includes my small family, Nourhan, my wife, and my two little children: 
Yazan and Tia, who were 5 and 3 when we arrived. “Migration throws objects, identities 
and ideas into flux” (Mercer, 2008, p.7). There are so many experiences of migration, of 
exile, or estrangement, whether forced or voluntary, beginnings or endings, but in my 
experience, as I suspect in others, moving as indeed thrown objects, identities and ideas 
into flux. This is the story of that flux. But there are migrations and migrations. In one 
sense the migrant, the exile, the stranger is a romantic figure, a lone explorer discovering 
the vast immensity of the world, absorbing it into their sublime experience. This is not my 
experience. My experience rather is that of what Edward Said has described as “the 
unhealable rift forced between the self and its true home” (Said, 2001, p.173). As a result 
of this rift life is lived in a strange state, indeed, a state of estrangement, in which one is 
never at home, and home exists only as an idea, a memory, something that can be recalled 
at times in stories. This story, therefore, is a story of estrangement.  
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It was the first time to travel for my wife and children, and they were terrified when 
the plane took off. We were looking at each other but saying nothing. I read and heard a 
lot about situations when one does not believe that something is happening, but I always 
thought that authors and even directors may be exaggerating, yet when we were speechless 
and when we let our eyes say it all, I realised that passion is much powerful than reality; 
dreams are stronger than life itself. What we were living at that moment was a dream. We 
had been struggling for years and living in a series of wars and crises. We were unable to 
live a normal life with the basic rights that everybody enjoys all over the world. We were 
under what Agamben would call “a state of siege”, our rights and freedoms suspended 
under an indefinitely prolonged State of Exception (Agamben, 2010, p.4). We wanted to 
travel and thought that by travelling we would give our children the best life we can offer, 
but everything was suspended because of the situation in Gaza Strip where you were given 
the very basic rights that keep you alive but nothing more. At that time we were all caught 
up in the immediacy of what it meant to inhabit a Sate of Exception. Now, as I am able to 
reflect back on it, I see how Walter Benjamin’s reading of the State of Exception transcends 
the mere everyday facts of our existence and understands in them a whole mode of history 
itself: history not as the free unfolding of Spirit (as Hegel would have it) but “a concept of 
history . . . that accords with . . . the real state of exception,” that is, the State of Exception 
as the rule in history, from which the rule of law, at times, diverts (Benjamin, quoted in 
Agamben, 2010, p.57). 
This was repeatedly reinforced by Israeli officials when they stated that Gaza can 
explode at any moment if we keep pressurising it. So, the number of hours when we get 
electricity was increased slightly after reaching just 2 hours a day for few months. 
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Suddenly, they decide to allow tens of people to travel through Eretz, the crossing point 
between Gaza and the outer world. Sometimes, they give permissions to some merchant to 
import limited quantities of goods that were prohibited for years. So, as we could see, it is 
not a case of besieging people to death but also it is not a situation where people can enjoy 
life. As such it is a kind of torture: it does not seek to destroy directly and immediately, but 
rather to prolong pain, to force the submission of a whole people. “Torture was a strict 
judicial game,” writes Foucault, “the victim was subjected to a series of trials, graduated 
in severity, in which he succeeded if he ‘held out,’ or failed if he confessed” (Kelly, 
Foucault, & Habermas, 2010, p.161). The torture to which we were subjected was not the 
torture of the torture chamber; it was not as obvious as this. It was a slow, drawn-out, weak 
torture that affected our everyday lives, sometimes hardly noticeable, but over time it wore 
us down.  
On the plane at the moment we left, I kept looking at my wife for a few minutes 
while she was staring at me asking with her eyes if this was true. It was like we were 
prisoners escaping from the torture of being under siege. It was too true to believe. As the 
plane began to fly, we were remembering all the horrible moments we had passed through 
during the last war a few months ago when we felt that we would be killed, especially when 
our building was targeted and when the surrounded area was bombarded as well. We 
remembered the 40th day of the 52-day war. At that night, we were certain that we would 
not see the next day. The bombs and explosions were very loud and two flats at our building 
were partially damaged because of illuminating shells. We also remembered one of the 
most difficult moments when Tia’s arm was broken, and I was supposed to take her to 
hospital where I was told that they only serious injuries were admitted. I went to another 
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hospital and luckily there was not a lot of bombing at that hour. We were thinking of all 
time we have been waiting to be granted a permission to cross Eretz. We kept talking about 
these memories and did not realise that our 6-hour journey came to an end. I think it was 
the fastest flight we have ever had.  
Luckily, one of our friends, who lives in Lincoln, insisted on coming to London to 
pick us and drive us to Chester. It was one of the best things we had in this journey. I can 
imagine how difficult it would be to push 6 big suitcases and several handbags with two 
children to the nearest train station and then move to Chester by train. I was sure it would 
be disastrous. I could not remember why it took so long to arrive to Chester, but I think it 
was traffic. I could see the looks of amazement in the eyes of my wife along the way. I 
could say that she did not believe that she arrived to the UK. It was the same for me but 
maybe a little bit different in this part as I came to the UK in 2013. However, the feeling 
that we did it was overwhelming us simultaneously. It was a strange feeling. We were 
exhilarated at having left Palestine finally, but at the same time disoriented by this new 
geography in a condition of what Georg Simmel has called “unbelonging.” The migrant, 
Simmel says: 
is fixed within a certain spatial circle . . . but his position within it is 
fundamentally affected by the fact that he does not belong in it initially and that 
he brings qualities into it that are not, and cannot be, indigenous to it . . . the 
distance within this relation indicates that one who is close by is remote, but 
his strangeness indicates that one who is remote is near (Simmel, 1908, p.259). 
 
We were both close but remote, and remote yet near. Our friend guided us, and helped us 
navigate this disorienting mixture of near and far.  
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As soon as we arrived, I noticed how amazed the children and my wife were. 
Everything looked and felt different for them, especially the weather. The first thing my 
wife noticed was how friendly people are. People whom we met at the airport, restaurants, 
public places before arriving to Chester were nice and friendly, and this was contrary to 
the stereotype we used to hear about English people. We used to believe that English people 
are arrogant and unfriendly. We understand that in these cases we cannot generalise but at 
that time, to us, it was as if the whole people behaved the same. The other noticeable thing 
was the number of nationalities you can see in one place. For example, when we stopped 
to have something to eat at one of the small malls in London, my wife was counting the 
nationalities she could recognise, and she was impressed by the way they could 
communicate. For her, she could classify people from China, Japan and Korea, People from 
Italy and Western Europe, people from Eastern Europe, People from Arabian Gulf, people 
from Egypt and other Arab countries and people from India and Pakistan in particular 
although I am sure she mixed people from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka with people from India 
and Pakistan due to the fact that she has never met people from these countries. She was 
very excited and so were the children.  
We were experiencing what I later came to identify, with the words of Appiah, 
“cosmopolitanism” (Appiah, p.207). It was not that everyone was the same, but rather that 
everyone was different and yet still apparently getting along with each other. Imagine how 
this appeared to us, we who had come from a locality in which the difference between 
Israelis and Palestinians is a source of violent hatred! What we saw was “dialogue among 
difference,” and “conversations among places” (Appiah, 2010, 207, p.225). In this 
cosmopolitan world I saw the idea expressed that “in the human community, as in national 
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communities, we need to develop habits of coexistence: conversation in its older meaning, 
of living together, association” (Appiah, 2010, xix). I began to hope, in those first few days, 
that through this kind of sympathetic imagination which I witnessed in the everyday space 
of the shopping mall, we—my family, the community in which we found ourselves, and 
perhaps even one day Israel and Palestine—would begin to develop “the capacity to follow 
a narrative and conjure a world” together (Appiah, 2010, p.224).  
The situation in Gaza is of course completely different. There we are not exposed 
to foreigners due to the number of people from other nationalities in Gaza. They visit Gaza 
mostly after wars as journalists and NGOs staff members. Their stay is normally short and 
they do not go to public places. The other type of international people is the staff of the 
UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). They are barely seen as their work 
is mainly at GFO (Gaza Field Office) where they spent most of their days and move very 
securely in their armoured vehicles to their accommodation. Only staff at the GFO can 
contact them. For my wife, she had not met a foreigner before although she studied at 
university in both her first and second degrees. Meeting people from other nationalities has 
always been something unique for the people of Gaza. As an interpreter, I used to 
accompany delegations when visiting Gaza and in many times, I found it almost impossible 
to ask children to stop surrounding journalists. My wife was so excited to communicate 
with people in the UK believing that this is the best way to improve her English. She 
achieved distinction in all the levels of her academic life but she still believes that her 
English should be improved and her dream, as she says, is to master both written and 
spoken English.  
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Why are these simple things so important? They are the basics of everyday life. We 
take them for granted. But I want to underscore in fact how radical it is, for us who have 
lived in Palestine, even to be able to speak freely with others. It is easy to be lulled into a 
sense of normality in times of freedom and peace. But under the “state of siege,” the “State 
of Exception,” this freedom to greet the other with speech and conversation is radically 
curtailed, forbidden, and dangerous. The thoughts of the French-Jewish philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas are important to me here, since he wrote in the aftermath of the terrible 
events of the Second World War, after so many episodes of violent separation, forced 
migration, and death. In a time when speech between some peoples became impossible he 
formulated a reparatory philosophy of speech in which speech itself becomes the plane on 
which the self and the Other reach an equality. “The speaker,” he writes, “is personally 
present in his speech, absolutely exterior to every image he would leave. In language 
exteriority is exercised, deployed and brought about. Whoever speaks attends his 
manifestation” (Levinas, 1991, p.296). Being manifest and exterior, the speaker is allowed, 
through language, to exist in his or her infinite Otherness, exceeding the boundaries of the 
Self to encompass them, allowing them to overflow and be free in the abundance of their 
language which always remains outside of any individual’s grasp.  
I was only able to begin processing some of these thoughts at the time during our 
long journey. I cannot understand why it took us more than 7 hours from Heathrow to 
Chester. My friend, the driver, told me that it was the traffic that affects our journey, but I 
cannot imagine that it added 4 hours to the time needed to arrive to Chester. Actually, I 
cannot say that because I was sleeping most of the way as I was told by my friend. These 
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experiences of movement are always accompanied by a kind of disorientation of space and 
time, signs that a change of being is taking place.  
We called the lady and her husband who were acting as our hosts to tell them that 
we would arrive at around 3:00 am and we would stay in a hotel in Chester and then go to 
them but they strongly refused and insisted that we keep the plan as it was. I tried to 
convince her that we were a few hours late and it was unfair to keep them awake until 3:00 
am but she did not accept any apologies and said that they would be happy to wait for us. 
Before arriving, I need to mention how great this lady and her husband are. They contacted 
us while we were in Gaza and offered to host us for a few weeks. This was through the 
secretary of the faculty who coordinated between us. It was the most wonderful surprise in 
my whole trip. For those who have not visited the UK yet, and for those who have not 
needed to rent a house or a flat when coming, I would like to mention that renting a house 
or a flat is the most complicated process especially for those who come with their families. 
For individuals, it might be easier as they can live at the university accommodation and 
they can arrange this a long time before arrival. However, for a 4-member family, things 
are more complicated. One of my friends came without arranging for accommodation and 
his life with his wife and children was really miserable for several weeks. This was the 
situation that I tried to avoid as its impact may last for the rest of the journey in the UK, 
and I was lucky to encounter a wonderful English couple. In order to rent a property, it is 
needed to have a bank account and to have a bank account, a permanent address is needed. 
It is a vicious circle that may last for weeks. Luckily, the English couple were so kind to 
host us for 5 weeks. It is acts of generosity like this which are the opposite of a State of 
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Exception. These actions remove the state of siege, they institute laws and protections, they 
create bonds of friendship, and create an ethical condition of existence.  
From the first moment we entered the house, we felt something familiar. It was the 
first time ever to sleep outside our house, but we did not feel strangers at all. This is 
basically due to the warm welcoming we were offered, but it was also because of the feeling 
that we moved from a family house to a family house with no nights at a hotel or any other 
places. I was surprised that they took care of the small details and made sure that our 
accommodation would be as comfortable as possible. The children woke up early the next 
day at 8:30 am, and we woke afterwards. In minutes, we were all having our breakfast. It 
was a very different breakfast from what we were used to. In Palestine, people start their 
days with a traditional breakfast that could include: falafel, hummus, cheese, egg, olive, 
za’tar, olive oil and beans. We were introduced to the English meals and we started being 
addicted to English tea about which we spent years hearing how much English people loved 
it. Nourhan does not like tea a lot and the number of cups she had drunk since we married 
in 2009 does not exceed 5. However, now she has tea with milk, which is unfamiliar in 
Palestine, at least once a day. Upon finishing breakfast, the husband accompanied me to 
the University of Chester Riverside building, and his wife started chatting with Nourhan 
and telling her about the country and Chester in particular. We did not feel excluded at all; 
on the contrary, we felt included and the children were enjoying their time in the yard with 
all the toys they were provided with. 
Another issue that we admired was that the couple served us Halal meat for dinner. 
They confirmed that the meat was Halal, and they told us about that even before we asked. 
I knew that the lady went to an English butcher and ordered the meat especially for us. This 
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was highly appreciated. Food has always been one of the main issues that confuse my 
friends when they travel especially that most of them travel without their families. They 
miss the Palestinian traditional food. From time to time, I invite some of them to share 
some Palestinian traditional food. I know what it feels like: I myself experienced missing 
our traditional food for a year when I was away from my family in 2013. The anthropologist 
Claude Lévi-Strauss has written that “a society’s cuisine acts as a language through which 
it unconsciously expresses its structure” (Lévi-Strauss, 1968, p.411). As we sat down 
together to eat I realised the truth of this statement. Food is social. It binds together those 
who eat it with social ties. Like conversation, this is something we do not ordinarily 
consider when we eat throughout the day. But these ties are important. It would be 
impossible to sit and eat with the Israelis who are at war with Palestine. No social bonds 
exist between us. But here we were, eating with people who knew nothing of us, but who 
had already accepted us.  
Food was always the key to different issues and topics. I remember the first morning 
when I was trying to make a cup of coffee. Our coffee is very different from the English 
one, and the kitchen was full of the aroma of coffee. The lady told me that she liked the 
smell of the coffee but not the taste as it was too strong. Food, in the lives of the Palestinian 
people, became a political issue. When we watch TV or read some articles in magazines 
and find that Israel has stolen our traditional dishes, we feel really angry. Hummus, falafel, 
tabbouleh and fattoush were introduced as an Israeli dishes in many exhibitions in Europe. 
It is painful when you see that everything is stolen from you even food. The issue of cultural 
appropriation and ethics is one that bleeds through the whole of Israeli-Palestinian 
relations. Like Young and Brunk I identify with Feinberg’s theory of “profound offense” 
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not in a legal sense but in a cultural one: the profound offense taken when one culture 
unethically seizes upon “a person’s core values and sense of self” (Young & Brunk, 2012, 
p. 5). 
Food is an important part of the cultures of peoples. It is mostly the first thing that 
visitors are introduced to. I was a little concerned about changing the habits of my family 
when we arrived especially when I knew that Chester is a city where the majority of its 
inhabitants are English people. However, as one of the many favours that were done with 
us, they guided us to Brook Street. The street has several eastern shops where one can find 
most of the things needed for our traditional food especially spices. It was true that we 
wanted to try something different and experience more about the English culture but it was 
a little bit difficult for us because we have some guests from time to time and we wanted 
to introduce our traditional Palestinian food to them. We also receive some HESPAL 
scholars who miss the Palestinian food. So, it was necessary to find a shop where we could 
satisfy our needs. One of my friends who has been living here for 7 years told me that I 
must stop having Palestinian food and start trying English food. At the beginning, it was 
good idea because we like trying new things, but after a while I felt that I cannot live in an 
isolation inside the isolation I am already living in. The idea is not in the food itself; it is 
in the memories we have when we taste something from Palestine. For us, we have a story 
with each dish. Some of them constitute very important parts of our lives.  
It was of no surprise to me to learn, at a later time, that one of the great theorists of 
“acculturation”—that is the blending of different cultures together—used the metaphor of 
food to express the intermingling of difference into a totality (Ortiz, 1947, viii). The Cuban 
Fernando Ortiz conceived of the long-cooking Cuban stew of mixed root vegetables and 
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spices (ajiaco) to have been created by the multiple creole groups inhabiting the island. 
The stew absorbed difference but also maintained it. The mixture was perfected by the 
addition of separate flavours. In the everyday challenges and experiences of our first 
months in Chester, it was these basic functions which took on great significance in our life 
and acculturation. Our palates changed, the food we ate, and the way we ate it also changed, 
as did those of our hosts. We were all transforming, but not violently. This was the 
difference between Chester and Palestine. 
Coincidently, I knew that a friend had the coffee we like, and I asked him to send 
it to me. I still have the envelop until now as an important part of my journey here. It 
includes many things for me. This small envelop and pack of coffee represent Palestine, 
friendship, displacement, memories, work and many other things. It represents what Deluze 
referred to as a kind of nomadism, within the context of another concept, “lines of flight.”  
A line of flight is a line that behaves “as if something carried us away, across our segments, 
but also across our thresholds, towards a destination which is unknown, not foreseeable, 
not pre-existent” (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007, p. 125). The line of flight transgresses the 
segmentation of our lives, the divisions, the boundaries, the borderlines which are set up 
around us. Within Palestine our lives were segmented by tightly controlled lines of force. 
It was by leaving that we embarked upon a line of flight, an escape. And when I received 
this small envelope I recognised another object which had also managed to transgress the 
boundaries of the military state.   
In this way, food was one of the ways that our lives continued to experience lines 
of flight. Coffee is so strongly connected with the UK where coffee represent an important 
part of the lives of English people. I started my story with coffee in the UK in 2013. I was 
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about 37 and I did not like coffee at that time. I lived with a Jordanian friend when I was 
studying at the University of Lincoln. He was studying forensic medicine and I remember 
that most of his speech was about terrible crimes about which he was asked to present a 
report to the police in to the extent that in many times I used to ask him to stop talking 
about these crimes especially as it was out first month in the UK and we were living in a 
big house with nobody else. The first time I sipped coffee was when he offered me a cup 
of coffee. It was really awful! However, as a gesture of thanking him for offering me that 
and as a part of our culture, I could not tell him how awful it was. After that, he started 
making me coffee every evening and when I was not in the living room, he used to go 
upstairs and knock my room door to give me the coffee, which was an Algerian one and 
very different from ours.  
Back to our first days in Chester, we invited our host and hostess to a Turkish 
restaurant in Brook Street. We enjoyed our time there and we returned home quickly to 
watch the wedding of Nourhan’s sister, which was on a channel on Youtube. Being 
surrounded by an English family who shared the happy moments of the wedding was 
strange but nice feeling at the same time.  
One of the things that concerned us the most was the inclusion of our children at 
school. We were really worried that it would be difficult for our children to be merged into 
the class especially since they did not speak English. A few days after the beginning of the 
school year, I was contacted by the head teacher and she told me that Yazan was looking 
very nervous, and that he had struck his hand on the table several times. When I spoke to 
Yazan, I knew that he was upset because he did not know what the other children were 
talking about. He felt strange. However, the school staff were really helpful and kind. They 
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took care of him and dealt with him and his sister professionally so that soon Yazan and 
Tia could not wait to go to school every morning.  
In the first few weeks, Yazan and Tia used to ask why they did not go to school on 
Saturday and Sunday. They thought that we did not take them to school deliberately. It was 
some time until they realised that it is the weekend and the school was closed. We took 
them to school on Saturday just to confirm that nobody goes to school on Saturdays and 
Sundays. One of the things that we have been happy with was the educational experience 
our children are having. This is also one of the things that we keep thinking about upon our 
return to Palestine. The two educational systems are totally different. While we appreciate 
the chance given to children to be creative and to raise questions here in the UK, I, myself, 
keep wondering about the effect of returning to schools in Gaza where learning and 
teaching depends mainly on memorising. Yazan and Tia would find it extremely difficult 
to adapt to the school system in Palestine after having been exposed to a learning process 
for three years in the UK.  
I am completely satisfied with the way my children are encouraged to raise 
questions and ask about things they do not understand at school. One of the reasons behind 
this satisfaction is the fact that in Palestine, we, as students, were not allowed to ask about 
things we did not understand, or we found illogical. This was a perfect example of 
Foucault’s description of the education system as a disciplinary institution: its purpose 
being not to lead children out of themselves (the etymological root of “education”) but 
rather to discipline them into being governable subjects of the dominating state regime 
(Foucault, 2012). Unfortunately, this disciplinary treatment continues to happen even at 
university, where the lecturer says only those things which one should write in the exam. I 
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am not generalising of course, but the majority of teachers deploy this methodology to the 
extent that creativity and innovation are suspended. In that sense we might consider the 
university, the lecture theatre, or the classroom, as simulacra of the state, presided over by 
the teacher who occupies a sovereign position. This raises a question about the granulation 
of the State of Exception, and suggests that while it may exist at the geopolitical level of 
the nation state, it may also be replicated in miniature, on more local (but no less 
pernicious) scales. Indeed, for Foucault, it was precisely this percolation of power down 
from the state through smaller institutions which ensured its replication and hegemonic 
force (Foucault, 2012).  
One of the things I remember very well, and which I keep comparing with studying 
in the UK, is the chance given to students to express themselves. My first degree in my 
country was in English literature where we studied a lot of novels, plays and short stories. 
Some of my instructors did not allow us as students to give our own opinions in analysing 
the literary text. For example, the themes of the work are the ones that the instructor gives. 
As a student, you need to write what was said in the lecture. There is no space for creativity. 
I had a Canadian-Palestinian friend whose English was really good given that he was born 
in Canada. Once, he wanted to contribute a new idea or a theme that he believed in from 
his own perspective when we were studying Robinson Crusoe, and this was considered a 
way of challenging the lecturer (Crusoe, 2013). He was given a poor mark for doing this. 
Thus, students started depending on memorization more than anything else. This is the 
thing that I do not want my children to experience. It kills their creativity. The issue that 
concerns me more than anything else in this regard is the fact that students study just to 
pass the exams. Exams became a goal not a means. The extra pressure put on the burdens 
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of students is increased by parents who believe that without passing with high marks, there 
will be no success. Success in life is strongly connected with getting high marks in exams. 
This is even proved through some proverbs in Arabic. For example, the common saying of 
“The proof of the pudding is in the eating,” which is used to show students that the day of 
the exam is the day when they will be judged to be either good or bad. 
My family’s experience of school could be described as one of cultural hybridity 
which keys-in to the conversations which cultural theorists have had around 
“multiculturalism”—a word we heard a lot in our time in Chester. In Chester we 
experienced the multiplicity of culture—rather than one culture attempting to dominate, 
and appropriate another to which it was aggressively opposed. This had an impact on our 
own experience of identity. “Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories,” 
writes Stuart Hall, “but, like everything which is historical, they undergo constant 
transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject 
to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture, and power” (Hall, 2000, p.23). We were 
Palestinians in Chester, and being there made us feel our Palestinianness strongly, yet we 
also understood that we were being changed. We were Palestinians, but we were becoming 
irresistibly changed. I have already spoken about how I witnessed this taking place in my 
children. Chester became part of our history, as we became part of it. 
Back to our experience in the UK, my wife started her Master’s degree at the 
University of Chester, and she was stunned by the experience itself. She said that she was 
learning things that she had not even heard before although she had already received her 
MBA before coming to the UK. My wife also found that the way her tutors used to teach 
is more inspiring and it encourages her to be more creative. For me, I realised these cultural 
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differences a few years ago when I came to the UK, so it was not such a new thing as it 
was for my wife and children. Being responsible for a family as well as for study was really 
hard for my wife. Spending most of the time at university, she was also supposed to take 
the children to and from school. This situation was completely difficult for her, especially 
compared to that in Gaza, where we used to send the children to their grandparents’, who 
live a few meters away from us, whenever we had exams or work to do.  
This side of life in the UK has been very different from life in Gaza. Neighbours, 
friends and family are around us all the time. You cannot feel alone while living in Palestine 
because people share all the good and bad times with you. Although we were hosted by a 
great English family, I know how tough being away from your extended family can be. We 
were lucky to meet that family, but many other scholars from Palestine talk about their 
loneliness when living here, especially in Ramadan and Eid.  
This returns us to the loneliness of exile, the estrangement of migration, which was 
theorised in the work of Said and Simmel. There is no doubting the melancholia of exile. 
The foreigner is always Other, exterior, outside. Yet while this affective plight may connote 
loss, the critical theory of the twentieth century has consistently acknowledged the tactical 
advantages of occupying this position. Walter Benjamin, himself an exile, perceived that 
it was by being outside a culture that a critical distance could be established, from which 
that culture could be looked at more discerningly (Osborne, 2005, p. 323). There is always 
a danger of romanticizing the outsider, and the condition of outsidership. Exile is a 
conflicted condition. “The unique combination of freedom and constraint” which attend 
the position of the exile, “and of the bizarre hybrid of exhilaration and depression that this 
bearing or posture occasions” must be acknowledged as inseparable (Sussman, 2007, p. 2). 
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That was our experience, not only ours, it was shared by the community of Palestinians we 
met in the UK away from their homeland in general.  
As many of the scholars who came through HESPAL are among my students or 
friends, we talk to each other from time to time. Some of them feel isolated especially in 
the first few weeks, particularly in winter. I suffered from that when I came alone in 2013 
and left my family in Gaza. However, I will always remember our friends in Chester to 
whom we were introduced by the family and other friends. It was something that I did not 
think could happen in the UK. Whenever a family has a party or an occasion for children, 
the family contacted us and we were introduced to other families who have children. Our 
children felt completely included, and they lived in peace.   
As for me and Nourhan, our daily life became very special and we could enjoy 
living peacefully after witnessing 3 wars in less than 5 years. Now, we start our day by 
going to one of the cafes here in Chester. We enjoy having our mocha without being 
watched, asked, or observed. We started changing several habits so that we can enjoy every 
moment of living in the UK. We just do whatever we like without much thinking of what 
others may think. This was part of the hard life in Gaza, where people do things just because 
of others. The story of coffee with my Jordanian friend is a simple representation of what 
I mean. I had it while I was living in the UK because we shared the same culture. This is 
an example of how people live in Palestine. We cannot ignore the other people and we have 
to do things we do not like because others may not like it if we don’t, even if not doing it 
would not harm anyone. I think one of the things which has made our life more comfortable 
in the UK is that we do not need to be obsessively careful of everything we do.  
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Freedom is an essential conception in our life in the UK. In the UK, we felt how 
ordinary people live and move freely. How people can plan for their daily lives without 
being worried about the repercussions of a governing power. It was perhaps when I started 
travelling freely and noticing the lives of people in the UK that I began to realise with full 
force the nature of the conditions of the State of Exception under which we had been living 
in Palestine. Familiarity and habit had inured us to the realities of a siege mentality, or what 
Agamben would call “legal civil war” (Agamben, 2010, p. 2). Our previous endurance of 
closed borders, the suspension of the rule of law, and emergency measures, was thrown 
into sharp relief by our experience of basic freedom and protection under the law in 
Chester. When I arrived in Chester, and when people asked me about my journey, I realised 
how shocked they were when they knew all the complications of travelling including the 
application for permission to enter Israel, visa, travelling to Jordan and the uncertain status 
we had to endure while I lived in waiting decisions from different authorities. When I 
compare that to the life people live in the UK, I found it unfair to be treated differently just 
because I am Palestinian. I experienced part of the feeling of freedom when we applied for 
visas to travel to France, Spain, Netherlands and Turkey. Things were so smooth just 
because I have residency in the UK. My children experienced travelling to different 
countries and different cultures and they were lucky to do that as I, myself, could not travel 
until I was 35, when I obtained my ID. This does not include moving from Kuwait to Iraq 
of course as I was young, and it was under the supervision of my father. One of the issues 
that I will face when we return to Gaza is the limited movement again. When I apply for a 
visa from Gaza, it is mostly rejected because most embassies believe that people are 
travelling and will not return. Moving freely has been one of the greatest feelings we have 
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ever had. One of the advantages of living in the UK is that you can decide and plan for 
your future without considering any illogical obstacles such as the ones we have in Gaza. 
In Gaza I cannot plan properly for my future and the future of my family because of all the 
restrictions we have. For example, I and my wife are going to have our graduation 
ceremony in March 2019, but we know that we will not be able to attend it because of the 
closure and siege imposed on Gaza. Although it has been a dream to celebrate our success 
together at the Cathedral, we are deprived of this right just because we are Palestinian. 
While I was writing these lines, news came from Gaza that there will be a devastating war 
on Gaza and some raids were already launched. We do not know even if we will be able to 
return on time or not.  
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Chapter 7: Critical commentary on a video to accompany stories on Palestine and 
the State of Exception 
At root, this is a project about stories: not just the narrative events which, together, 
complete a story, but the form of the story itself as a way of knowing. The three stories 
which I have written and which form the core of this project are experiments in the weaving 
together of my own subjective experiences with theoretical discourses that help to situate 
my experiences within broader epistemologies of power and knowledge. Together, this 
combination of theory and experience offers a strategy to investigate the states of exception 
which I, as a Palestinian, have experienced and critiqued through my journeys.  
 Why, then, introduce, at this point, a wholly new medium altogether, that of video? 
Does doing so risk opening up a completely new set of complex discourses without 
embedding them sufficiently within the already existing paradigm of narrative and 
storytelling which has defined the arts-based research practice detailed in the preceding 
methodology? This risk is real, and I will acknowledge the outlines of the complex 
discourses on media and visuality which have emerged over the last three decades to deal 
critically with images in a postcolonial context. However, I hope to show here that the use 
of video in the present context in fact avoids these issues once it has been understood less 
as a distinct epistemology of the image distinct from the textual stories, and rather as 
something simpler: that is, as an illustration. In this sense, the video component of this 
work plays a role in the basic act of storytelling, of sharing my personal experiences—not 
by way of a laborious manipulation of images according to a highly complex system of 
video direction, editing, and mise-en-scène typical of commercial film, but rather in an 
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improvised, ready-to-hand, awkward, frank presentation of reality with no pretence at an 
established aesthetic of filmic beauty.  
Despite this claim, it must be acknowledged that there is no “outside” to the 
aesthetic per se in film—which is inherently a medium addressed to the senses. Instead my 
approach here might be thought of as an “anti-aesthetic,” an active refusal of the governing 
norms which conventionally determine the way films look. At root this relates to a 
fundamental conviction derived from the French neo-Marxist philosopher Jacques 
Rancière about the formative and influential relationship between aesthetic acts and politic 
acts. Following Rancière, I am convinced that aesthetic acts can be understood not as an 
alternative paradigm to politics but instead as “configurations of experience that create new 
modes of sense perception and induce novel forms of political subjectivity” (Rancière, 
2013, p. 3). This means that in composing a video I am composing and re-composing my 
sense impressions of the world, and that in doing so I am also recomposing a political point 
of view. 
Thinking of it from a basic semiological perspective, what the video presents is a 
different species of sign: it presents indices, real electronic traces of the subject’s body (my 
own) and the objects which have been affected by these stories (my identity cards, my 
possessions, and my family). The linguistic sign has an arbitrary relation to what it signifies 
(I know this only too well as a non-native English speaker)—but the image is non-arbitrary. 
The image is “physically or causally related to its referent” and this chain of causality 
passes through my smartphone, through my hand, my arm, and my whole body as it moves 
and films and continues to live in the world constituted out of the journeys through which 
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it has passed. My stories tell these movements—my video makes them really present 
(Evans & Hall, 2013, p. 13).  
 The illustrated story is epistemologically distinct from the video narrative or film. 
A video narrative exists on its own terms, independent of any text, whereas the images of 
an illustrated story retain an inseparable relationship to the text. There is, of course, no set 
formula for the nature of the relationship between image and text in an illustrated story, 
and either image or text may dominate at different moments. Yet within the context of my 
work, the stories themselves are paramount, and the medium of video is deployed as a 
means of illustrating—that is, adding visual detail—to information which is already 
embedded in the text itself. Bringing together this synthesis of media forms represents a 
convergence which is typical of (rather than being an exception from) the way that stories 
are constructed and experienced in contemporary culture. Older media cultures are 
absorbed into new information technologies but “still recognised in the way that text, 
images, and video are presented” and it is therefore “in their synthesis and continued 
influence and acceptance of new ways of interacting with information” that new forms of 
understanding are constructed through combinations of texts and images (Doyle, Grove, & 
Sherman, 2018, p. 487). The video material offered here, therefore, does not represent a 
separate visual, audio narrative, but rather adds a further layer on top of the existing stories, 
synthesizing their key imagery, presenting objective documentation, serving as a reference 
to the objects, people, and texts which populate those narratives.  
 The history of video in arts-based research can be traced back to the wide 
dissemination of video media in the wake of traditional film used in ethnographic, 
sociological, and anthropological work. “Video made possible extended recordings in 
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different settings,” especially once technology had developed “into lighter and more user-
friendly equipment, driven by consumer demand” so that a transfer took place “from the 
researcher’s exclusive use of rare and expensive film equipment . . . to the ubiquitously 
available smartphone” which requires “a reformulation of the constraints and affordances 
of video research,” bearing on ownership and participation (Leavy, 2018, p.322). The use 
of video thus becomes “one of the most important resources for describing and 
understanding the world or some aspect of it” and is part of a general diversification of 
research tools available in arts-based research (Barone, & Eisner, 2012, p.169).  
While a growing body of research practices deploy video as the dominant source 
of data gathering, in my research practice the video imagery instead complements the 
dominant medium of storytelling through text. As will be seen, the video helps to visualise 
the travels in my story cartographically, it presents images of my documentation (some of 
the most important artefacts discussed in the stories), it also serves to reinforce the presence 
of the theoretical texts discussed throughout as objects which can be possessed and carried 
through these journeys by filming the actual texts I carried with me. This is an important 
reality of the discourse of this project. Roland Barthes reminds us that “discourse” itself is 
etymologically rooted in journeying: “dis-cursus—originally the action of running here 
and there, comings and goings, measures taken”—discourse is a journey (Barthes, 2010, 
p.3). I have already referred, in the stories themselves, to the striated linear, deterritorialied 
space through which my journeys and those of my family traced their own “lines of flight” 
and how these amounted to a kind of discourse on Barthes’s sense: a “running here and 
there, comings and goings” (see Deleuze & Guattari, 2017, 223ff). But I also wish to give 
a sense of how “lines of flight” has also meant, for me, fleeing with lines of text—that is, 
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carrying with me the lines of theoretical text which, in my possession, as luggage, as 
something I carry with me, as a portable discourse, have themselves become a kind of map 
through which I can trace my own “dis-cursus.” Thus it is important to me to show the 
books I have carried with me. Those books were not only ideas, they were weights, objects, 
physically inscribed with the effects of my journey. I became attached to them. That is why 
they must be seen, not only cited. In this sense the text has a new materiality: it is like a 
monument.  
Photographs mentioned in the stories are also made visible, as well as archival 
documentation, including manuscripts by my father, and footage of the actual spaces I 
inhabited (in particular, the home in which my family stayed in Chester).  
The privacy and immediacy which I believe these photographs convey are a 
powerful addition to the project’s epistemology. Like the video itself, these are not 
carefully edited compositions—more often they testify to the speed with which everything 
has to be carried out: there is no time to compose the perfect shot, instead places, people, 
objects are quickly grasped in the moment—an application, as it were, of some of the 
techniques of urban street photographers who must respond instantly to the appearance of 
a new and previously unphotographed image before it disappears (Rosenheim & Arbus, 
2016). These photographs, photographs of documents, and documents are also more than 
illustrations—they are artefacts. They do not only represent things, they are also significant 
objects themselves, either because they have travelled with me, or because they carry the 
aura of having facilitated my journey—for example my ID card and refugee card. These 
objects are real, they bring the message home: this really happened, this “story” is not just 
a story.  
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Again it is Roland Barthes who is able to pin-point the impact of the image (as 
opposed to the text) as a “punctum”—a puncturing force: “the photographs I am speaking 
of are in effect punctuated, sometimes even speckled with these sensitive points . . . these 
marks, these wounds . . . I shall call [them the] puncture; for puncture is also: sting, speck, 
cut, little hole . . . a photograph’s punctual is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises 
me, is poignant to me” (Barthes, 2012, p. 27). Above all, what “pricks” the viewer of the 
photograph is its indexical nature. That person was really there. The light that reflected off 
of their body made a mark in the camera which I see now. Those are my possessions piled 
up before leaving. That is my bomb-damaged neighbourhood. This is my son, safe, after 
the journey. There is no equivalent in the text of the punctum which these images can effect.  
Rather than attempt to embark upon a convoluted methodological discussion of the 
ontology of the video image, I instead present these materials in terms of illustration, and 
then in terms of increasing the dissemination of, and access to, my research. Indeed, within 
the field of educational psychology, video has long been considered a means of 
strengthening access and participation by subjects (Como & Anderman, 2016). The 
instantaneity of video imagery and the ease with which it can be shared from researcher to 
researcher has a positive effect on the circulation of research findings and increasing access 
to its key details in contexts where the entire text of a thesis may be more difficult to 
disseminate. Thus distillation is a key property of the short form video narrative: a 
distillation of objects, images, and places which capture and illustrate key components of 
the text narratives, enhancing their memorability and the ease with which they can be 
disseminated among other researchers.  
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These concerns help to determine the form of the video itself. The video is a 
“short”—approximately eight minutes long, filmed by hand with a phone camera, which 
visually documents many of the objects and spaces which have been mentioned in the 
stories themselves. While the stories are not the “script” of the video, they supply its mise-
en-scène, or visual context. The aim of the video is to provide an alternative means for 
visualizing the data of the project, composing and selecting a visual narrative which draws 
parallels with the arts based methodology of the thesis and Palestine as a State of Exception 
in which the rights of Palestinians are held in suspension, where arbitrary borders are 
created by the West, demarcating juridical states of “bare life.”  
In order to perform this, the video eschews the conventional techniques of narrative 
film, and instead works as a visual illustration of the text, enhancing the stories themselves. 
There is a rich seam of critical theory which has deconstructed the Hollywood-type 
coherence of narrative cinema, in which the film medium itself disappears, rendering a 
highly illusory world in which the film’s own role as a representation (often a highly 
ideological one) is repressed (Stam & Miller, 2000). Drawing on critical film theory 
(notably via Laura Mulvey’s’s feminist critique of Hollywood film and Stuart Hall’s visual 
cultural approach to the politics of the image), would be ways to further explore how video 
seeks to produce a set of visual techniques which can radically deconstruct normative 
experiences and critically engage with the codes embedded within normative modes of 
production (Mulvey, 1989; Hall, Evans, & Nixon, 2013). Yet rather than pursue the 
implications of these re-readings of film history, the aim of this video is to remain closely 
tied to the function of illustrating a narrative text, in order better to testify to and reflect the 
daily experiences of Palestinians, in which the experience of not belonging, of being 
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outside of identity, of living in a camp along the border of the World is engendered by the 
State of Exception.   
Yet, it must be stated that my visual methodology reflects this position by self-
consciously refusing the idea of completion, wholeness, and naturalness, which defines 
aesthetically established visual forms of presentation. The grammar of film, especially 
commercial film, even with its range of camera shots, sutures the expectations of the 
audience which on the whole has grown up being with film, into specific forms of narrative, 
which have their own ways of establishing completion, conformity, and so belonging.  
Establishing shots, closing shots, shots which ask questions, shots which indicate that we 
should contemplate and question what we see—and especially self-consciously reflect on 
the role of the medium itself in constructing the narrative—all provide a grammar with 
which to critique the relationship between what we see in film and how it is represented. 
The phone video inherently transgresses the norms which define Hollywood-type narrative 
cinema, both through its technical limits, as well as through its radical removal of the 
massive apparatus of film crews and production costs. Thus the hand-held camera becomes 
the double of my narrative voice in the stories: it captures my experiential data, connecting 
the movements and context of my own embodied experience as a researcher with the 
images on display. By this means the fiction of a “natural life” is deconstructed and 
replaced by the suspended condition of the State of Exception.  
These are, of course, the main themes of the stories themselves and they 
demonstrate that there exists a complete overlap between the video illustrations and the 
stories themselves. The key feature of the video illustrations is that they do not lead away 
from the stories but rather keep attention fixed on them. Yet, it is also true that the technique 
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of the video illustrations themselves does not impose a false sense of completeness on the 
stories. Indeed, it is the very hesitancy and contingency of the phone camera medium which 
supports the suspended condition of the State of Exception, the fragility of life in that 
condition, and the uncertain momentum and mobility of life conducted in a boundary-
crossing environment. For this reason the video illustrations do not present a clean-cut, 
authoritative presentation of established facts: rather they themselves embody the 
transitory and uncertain nature of the State of Exception.  
If the opening sequence of the video evokes the convention of the animated credit 
sequence it does so only to disturb it with a prolonged, awkward passage of video in which 
I film myself writing out the title of my project by hand. Writing is a kind of labour. Its 
time is not the time of the rapidly edited action thriller or the neatly packaged narrative—
word follows laborious word coming from the hand, sometimes with uncertainty and 
slower than expected. This is perhaps easy to forget when reading the edited typescript of 
a finished text. The function of video here is to force a recognition in the viewer of the 
temporality of thinking and writing and the resistance that we face when we attempt to 
write. The scene of the writing table also serves as a place to introduce the other 
protagonists in my stories—Agamben’s two texts, The State of Exception and Homo Sacer 
which stand in a physically proximate relationship to my own production. 
The line of text—the line of my handwriting—is continuous with the cartographic 
line of my journey. I move from one to the other. Attached to my body the phone camera 
moves from the desk to the wall, from one epistemology to another. The room in which 
this takes place—my room, an ordinary room, a domestic interior like any other, is also, 
for all its simplicity, a scene which stages the two fundamental activities out of which this 
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project is made: moving and writing. The domestic table and the interior wall, while private 
and relatively secure spaces, nonetheless for me perform the work of staging the documents 
of the State of Exception. I hope that the viewer is able to appreciate this quality, which 
Freud’s concept of the “unheimlich” might describe—the feeling of being at home and yet 
not being at home, of alienation from a source of identity, of displacement and difference. 
This is the predicament I wish these shots to illustrate: the precariousness of the spaces we 
take for granted.   
The domestic interior is always already a mediatised environment. It is not only a 
series of surfaces for the display of printed imagery but also a stage for the display of digital 
imagery which broadcasts from around the globe. In one sense interior and local, the 
domestic space is also a node within a global network of flows of images and stories, and 
the television is often the centre, and gateway, of these information streams. Thus from the 
map my phone camera turns towards the television which reveals the background music—
a Palestinian song sung by an Egyptian group filmed in London. This configuration 
highlights the shared, diasporic experience of displacement and the sympathy which exists 
between Arab peoples across multiple geographies. The song is especially poignant to me 
because it is filmed in front of Marble Arch in London, an iconic focal point, a gateway, a 
ceremonial border point. In the urban fabric of the capital this monument may not have 
outstanding significance but for me the ancient function of the triumphal archway as a 
threshold, as a border point, takes on a new meaning as a symbolic entry point into a new 
life.  
The picture of the music video brings into focus an important feature of the video 
which I have made, which is its relationship to other forms of media representation. All 
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media are, by definition, “mediations”—they construct the reality they represent. Thus they 
are never free from rhetoric and ideology. By taking the camera in one hand and 
manipulating objects in the other hand I am working with a technique which is deliberately 
personal, and one which is deliberately opposed to the uniform corporate broadcast 
viewpoint. I cannot myself step back and away from the representation because I am 
personally holding the camera. I am the mediator of my own story and I cannot be 
disassociated from the camera. Part of what this means is a taking back of the system of 
representation—of representing me, my story, and the nation to which I belong—from 
larger, more powerful systems of representation which are ideologically motivated. By this 
I principally mean Israel and its power to manipulate and construct its own version of 
Palestine through media imagery. The power of this ideological mediation of Palestine by 
a foreign power cannot be underestimated. It promulgates through global networks of 
circulation and calcifies into stereotyped representations and beliefs which Palestinians 
must then, in their everyday lives, confront, and be judged against. Israel has declared its 
ownership over the imagery of Palestine, creating is own ownership over the imagery, self-
creating its own perfect image of Palestine, a way of creating ownership over it through 
narrative.  
My response is to make this video, to contest a dominant representation with 
another, to take the personal embodied view and dismantle and disrupt the self-contained 
image of a self-contained country. The resulting video may not “look right” in the sense 
that it may not conform to prevailing standards of video representation in terms of its 
cleanness and sophistication—but it is precisely through these technical “faults” that it is 
able to produce ideological “fault lines” within the ways that Palestine has been represented 
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by external forces. By this means I wish to show the reader/viewer that there is a connection 
between the personal and the imperfect—the imperfect being a political corrective to the 
ideal image of the state.  
Within its structure, the video will present an image or declaration of the 
perfect/ideal representation and expression of Israel as a state which has always existed in 
the mind of Israel. This fiction is presented in the Israeli media as self-evident, natural, the 
way things have always been. The seamlessness of the media narratives which present it 
this way appear to confirm the inevitability and incontestability of the representation. My 
own unsteady phone camera video obviously juxtaposes with this visual narrative, 
deliberately destabilizing its stability. The phone is attached to my hand and my body, it 
fixes subject to object, establishes a direct relationship, instantiating the transitory nature 
of life in movement and the disruptions and interruptions of life. As such the video does 
not pretend to be able to produce a perfect image. In fact, it insists that no such 
representation can exist without detaching the video from the subject. By insisting upon 
the unstable nature of representation I wish to make the argument that all narratives of 
Palestine which lack this instability must to a large extent consist of fictions which exclude 
the subjective experience and lives of Palestinians.  
A further aspect of the reality effects of the video I have attempted to produce is its 
relation to time. The video is shot in real time. It is not cut and edited and montaged like a 
Hollywood narrative in which a patchwork of fragments are arranged in highly ordered 
artificial ways in order to tell a particular kind of story which leaps across multiple 
temporalities. Again, due to its direct connection with my body the camera in my video is 
bound to the irresistible linear flow of time from beginning to end in a continuous take. If 
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it is impossible to edit and reconstruct reality, the camera is locked into a different 
temporality. Real time intervenes. The time it takes for me to write. The time it takes for 
me to walk over to the map, the time it takes for me to fumble with my identity card with 
one hand while holding the camera in my other—these are all episodes which surely would 
be edited out of any feature film or documentary, yet in some senses they are the most 
important parts of my video. The testify to the intrusion of real time, of the disrupted nature 
of all experience. Identity is a difficult, awkward thing to grasp—what better way to show 
this than in the fumbling gesture of my hand, wary of the time it is taking to film this shot, 
having difficulty exposing the small image to the light of the camera. This is not just “bad 
technique,” it is instead, in effect, an allegory of the subject. 
Thus it might be said that what the video portrays is that which is ordinarily not 
allowed to be seen—the “obscene,” that is, etymologically, the “off-stage,” the things 
which are beyond the scope of the ordinary systems of representation. In terms of the 
cultural imaginary of Israel and Palestine the obscene can also be expressed as that which 
is behind the wall of representation—the parts of Palestinian life and subjective experience 
which escape and evade the attempts of the Israeli media apparatus to represent them. Thus 
my painfully slow writing, my awkwardly lit and out of focus presentation of photographs 
are all significant precisely because they resist the expected means of representing myself 
as a Palestinian, because they would never be the techniques employed by an external 
power. They are so un-technical that they become, in fact, a wholly new set of techniques. 
These gestures and episodes testify to that which is not normally seen, which remains 
hidden and out of sight behind the way, submerged under the regime of Israeli-dominated 
representations of Palestine.  
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Nevertheless, in all of these gestures there is an ultimate sense of pathos, or loss. 
Kobena Mercer has written that this sense of “discrepancy” and melancholia marks all 
forms of diasporic experience (Mercer, 2008). Perhaps the clearest way that this emerges 
in the unfolding of the video narrative is in the display of objects. As memories or 
souvenirs, these documents all point to something which is ultimately absent: Palestine. 
My identity, my rights, my possessions, my home, my father—these are all things which 
are not present for me in any other way than in signs. I have the images but not the things 
themselves. The video is a representation of representations and the laborious sequence of 
presenting each of these tokens reinforces, I hope, the painful sense that the things to which 
all of these representations point, are ultimately not there. Again this relation between sign 
and signified is particularly acute in the image, as opposed to the text. When we can see 
the objects which are lost their absence becomes all the more apparent. While the video 
narrative itself creates form and structure, an aesthetic assemblage of signs which has 
meaning and value and which is held together by the continuity of my own body and its 
subjective time, the disrupted and incomplete nature of this gesture finally serves to signify 
the challenging series of absences which define the State of Exception in which 
Palestinians must live.  
120 
Conclusions 
Stories of displacement and migration rarely come to a final ending. Part of the condition 
of mobility is the always temporary and contingent nature of space and time. Stories 
emerge and unfold and proliferate according to what Deleuze and Guattari would call a 
rhizome logic—ends are not termini but rather points of divergence where one narrative is 
interrupted by another from which it diverges while remaining attached, continuing on to 
the next bifurcation, and the next, and the next. That is the case with the stories presented 
here. Even during the period of their composition the events they describe have continued 
to unfold and remain suspended in different states of non-conclusion, even at the moment 
when, as now, time is taken to attempt to bring into at least a provisional focus, the entirety 
of the project. The new understanding of the experience of Palestinian academics and their 
families in the UK to which this thesis has been directed must, therefore, inevitably serve 
as an intermediary conclusion, ready to be updated in due course.   
Each of the stories presented here take up the question of experience posed by the 
thesis title, attempting to investigate what constitutes experience under the specific state of 
exception and proposing that under this condition narrative alone cannot fully account for 
it. Experience of the state of exception by subjects whose lives also intersect with the 
transnational networks of academic inquiry is inflected by theory and this inflection 
introduces an element of distanced self-reflection and analysis closely interleaved with 
direct experience of events. The narratological methodology which has resulted, which 
modulates between first person narrative and reflections on theory, constitutes an emergent 
property of the research and constitutes the leading contribution of this work to the field.   
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This research therefore reasserts the inherent provisionality of experience under the 
conditions of the state of exception. If that state changes (though there is little in current 
geopolitical affairs to suggest that it soon will) then it may be the case that the experience 
of Palestinian academics and their families living abroad may evolve alternative 
appropriate methods of narrative. Yet the overriding finding of this work is that new 
experience reflects back upon earlier moments in narratives, changing their significance in 
light of events as they progress and alter. The stories, then, are presented here not as the 
final statements on a subject (my own subjectivity, the subject of my experience, the critical 
theory of Agamben and others), but rather as studies of always inherently provisional data 
drawn from my own experience as an academic and writer. Yet, the argument of this thesis 
is that provisionality is not a lack or a disadvantage—rather that provisionality, 
contingency, and suspension are all in the nature of our experience of place and time. While 
we may wish for an experience of finality and arrival—to come home—the nature of the 
journey is that, more often than not, we are instead suspended within a border condition, 
neither quite here nor there. To use a term from narratology, we are perpetually in a 
condition of medias res—a situation which inherently resists the finality of the totalitarian 
state (Prince, 2003, p. 46).  
Journeys are full of movement, but also moments of stasis. Periods of walking, 
driving, flying (when movement is most intense) are followed by durations of waiting, 
staying put, resting, or being prevented from carrying on. In the same way, the sequence 
of writing this project is itself marked by a differentiated temporality, in which these 
conclusions represent a moment of critical reflection back over the distance already 
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travelled—with the full knowledge that there is further to go, though where and when and 
how is not always certain.  
 If a visual signature of this differentiated temporality were to be looked for, it might 
be found in the jogging, stuttering yet highly direct and immediate field of vision of the 
smartphone camera presented in the video. This visual/cinematic position correlates with 
a particular position of subjectivity and experience, situated within the home of the 
Palestinian family living abroad. Its instability represents my instability. Its movement is 
my movement. Its visual data is attached to the data of my own perceptual experience, and 
its limits are the household I share with my family who, like me, are also displaced, and 
inhabiting spaces in a temporary way. My insistence on this narrative device has emerged 
out of a basic methodological conviction that it is through the personal experience of the 
researcher that critical theory and broader discourse on the subject of Palestine should be 
approached. The tying together of provisionality and subjectivity represent one of the key 
findings of this research and assert themselves in the face of conventional claims for final 
certainty and positivist fact. These alternative positions, which distance themselves from 
the immediacy of such forms of first person narrative and POV film, in search of a more 
fundamental or generalisable basis for discourse, might enjoy a certain advantage in terms 
of the level of generality they are able to apply to the subject, but it has been my intention 
here to make a contribution through the particularity of my own subjective experience, and 
to draw on this first-person data as a driving methodology throughout this project, and not 
dismiss it as contingent and therefore exceptional and non-objective. This is to say that 
methodology inherently has a political basis and that the commitment to provisionality, 
immediacy and subjectivity are not marginal methodological concerns but rather central 
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claims. In some sense this might be seen as reversing the conventional outcome of a thesis 
project: that it is the methods which take on the nature of the findings. It will be 
remembered that from a positivist point of view the subjectivity of the researcher is 
inevitably, and purposefully excluded from the research process, coded as an interference, 
an alien particle liable to distort the accuracy and reliability of results with their presence 
(Mizrahi & Davis, 2008, vol. III, p. 492). The critical reversal which this project has made 
is to reevaluate the “distortion” effected by the presence of the “alien particle” as in fact a 
new way to see, investigate, and interpret the State of Exception. Rather than conclusions 
in the traditional sense, this research project presents “strategies-as-findings” instead—not 
only recorded experiences but methods for the documentation of experience.  
 The state of the “alien particle” is one of imbalance. It will be recalled that 
Agamben’s declared purpose in The State of Exception was to examine what he called “a 
point of imbalance,” the “no-man’s land” between “public law and political fact” 
(Agamben, 2010, p.1). This imbalance, or no-man’s land, was not framed as a permanent 
state of affairs but, as its name implies, an exceptional state of affairs originating in the 
declaration by a sovereign power in response to extreme internal conflict. Yet, while it has 
the nature of a crisis, and while it appears at first to be a momentary state of affairs, and 
while the experience of inhabiting this state is one of sudden and unpredictable change, it 
is a temporary crisis indefinitely prolonged.  
 The stories and video presented here represent both a documentation and a critical 
reflection upon the experience of the “stripped down creaturely life” without rights or 
protection endured by subjects who have been abandoned by the protection of the law and 
inhabit a dangerous space of indistinction in which the sovereign is free to act with 
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impunity and without limits (Agamben, 2010, p. 2). Their significance rests both on their 
documentary nature and arguments.  
 Current scholarship on practice-based research has focussed on reclaiming the 
validity of practice as a form of research—less so on the formulation of new hybrid forms 
of research which accommodate critical aspects of practice in order to promote new forms 
of analysis. The “Practice-led Research, Research-led Practice” model in the creative arts 
is typical: it entertains the idea that research and practice interact and that either one may 
take the lead, yet it maintains the autonomy of both terms without considering the 
possibility of cross-contamination between the two (Smith & Dean, 2014). Nelson has 
considered the relationship between practice and research to be governed by principles, 
protocols and resistance (Nelson, 2003). Barrett and Bolt (2019) likewise assert that 
research and practice enjoy a productively dynamic relationship, rather than being opposed 
to one another. The research presented here has shown that these terms cannot adequately 
serve as either the conceptual or the methodological basis for investigating the question of 
Palestinian academics’ and their families’ experience of the state of exception.  
The key argument of this project—set out by means of the stories and video—is 
that the space of indistinction inhabited by the subject calls for a radical (that is, 
fundamental) response on the level of narrative. My response has been formulated at this 
level by working through a narrative method that combines and weaves together first-
person story-telling and theoretical analysis—an approach which it makes no sense to 
parcel out into “research” and “practice.” Agamben argued that the State of Exception 
emerges as the state’s apparatus for dealing with “citizens who for some reason cannot be 
integrated into the political system” (Agamben, 2010, p. 2). The experience of non-
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integration is indeed characteristic of Palestinians and, in response to the potential critique 
that first-person narrative and academic citations do not sit well together—are not 
integrated—I would respond that it is this very non-integration of conventional textual 
modes which my project instrumentalises as an effective methodology in itself. It is as if a 
critic might express their wish that the shakiness of the smartphone camera be eliminated 
from the video and the POV kept still. Under the terms of my response this is impossible. 
It would imply a level of totalisation which is out of step with the contingent and decentred 
position which is the subject of this project in relation to its central question concerning 
the nature of the experience of Palestinian academics and their families in the UK. Indeed, 
it would imply a resolution of state, it would imply arrival, it would imply the restoration 
of the law—it would imply home.  
 There is perhaps an extent to which “home” (law, order, the restoration of rights) 
represents the longed-for yet endlessly displaced conclusion of this project. There is no 
doubt that this desire is operative. It is matched by the desire for a return of the absent 
one—a nation, a father, a job, an apartment building. Yet, while the condition of the exile 
is indeed characterised by a melancholy of loss, absence, displacement, and lack, whose 
expression can be nothing other than lamentation, there are many reasons also to positively 
and critically evaluate the condition of the exile as one that enjoys a certain privileged 
viewing position in relation to the operation of power and one whose strategies for the 
documentation and analysis of experience have something critical to offer. Even though it 
is subject to power in perilous ways, the position of the exile has the advantage of first-
hand experience of space in its most exceptional state, a feeling for the texture of its borders 
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and limits, and an image of power viewed from the outside, translated into a double-coded 
narratological structure of immediate experience and theoretical reflection.  
 It has been the argument of this project that the State of Exception is an inherently 
spatial formation of borders, limits, frontiers, and camps. In the case of Palestine 
specifically the spatial logics of annexation, encroachment, and militarily enforced 
peripheral borderlands—which are all in a constant state of reinscription both physically 
and legislatively—define the spatiality of the State of Exception and are characteristics of 
the camp, “the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we are still living” 
(Agamben, 2016, p.166). Again, by means of the first-person narrative, these borders and 
matrices have been “felt,” as it were, haptically, by the embodied “I” which moves through 
the stories emically (that is, from the inside) rather than etically (from the outside), while 
at the same time retaining the capacity to frame and re-frame the picture through immanent 
theoretical analysis. Rather than observing disinterestedly from a position of ideal 
objectivity (the scenario of positivism), this project has argued that first-person narrative 
enhances critical analysis by means of its direct experiential account of space as an 
instantiation of political crisis. The altered state of the critical voice of the researcher in 
this scenario is (it is hoped) matched by an altered state of the reader. The overlap of this 
project with the practice of authoethnography offers the possibility of an empathetic 
engagement with critical theory which in turn may initiate, as Leavy has written, “the 
possibility of enlarging our understanding of the world” through processes of becoming 
“more understanding, tolerant, and open to the needs and perspectives of those with whom 
we share differences” (Leavy, 2018, p.194). The “understanding” which is referenced in 
the title of this dissertation, therefore, (“understanding the experiences of Palestinian 
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academics and their families in the UK) is an understanding distributed across not only 
those subjects whose Point of view has been directly represented but a broader 
understanding transmissible through the ultimately co-participatory act of a writer writing 
and a reader reading.  
 The first person narrative has also provided an antidote to the void which the work 
of Agamben produces in its devastating critique of the State of Exception as the defining 
spatial experience of modernity. In his re-reading of Agamben, Abujidi was shown earlier 
to emphasise the power of Palestinian struggle and resistance within the paradigm of the 
camp, noting the absence of any such treatment in Agamben’s work (Abujidi, 2009, p.288). 
While the current project has not endorsed the rhetoric of struggle and resistance—which 
is fundamentally associated with a Marxist conception of collective class struggle 
somewhat out of step with a first person narrative—the stories do work to map out other 
spaces and experiences within the camp. Whereas the camp reduces the subject to bare life, 
the story restores to the subject to a degree of legality—not the law of state, not any law 
that physically protects the subject from violence, but, as it were, an aesthetic law, a 
network of narrative logics which help to secure the subject’s position within a non-
juridical space which the reader, too, may inhabit. The story and the video are responses to 
the State of Exception, alternatives to it, attempts to find a way out of it. In essence this 
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